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ABSTRACT 
TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY: INTERPLAY BETWEEN MORTALITY 
SALIENCE, DEATH-THOUGHTS, AND  
OVERALL WORLDVIEW DEFENSE 
Sharon R. Shatil, B.A., M.S. 
Marquette University, 2012 
This study examines both the generalizability of Terror Management Theory (TMT) and 
the mechanisms by which individual difference variables work in the TMT model. A 
plethora of research exists to support TMT, a theory that explains much of human 
behavior as attempts to buffer the potential for anxiety provoked by being aware of one‟s 
own inevitable mortality (Pyszczynski et al., 2003).  This dissertation investigated the 
generalizability of Terror Management Theory (TMT) and the mechanisms by which 
individual difference variables work in the TMT process. In order to do so, an 
operationalization of the variable “overall worldview” was provided. Participants 
consisted of 367 college students from the Psychology Department Experimental Subject 
Pool of a mid-sized Midwestern university. Subjects were quasi-randomly assigned to a 2 
(mortality salience vs. control) x 2 (death-thought word stems vs. neutral word stems) 
between subjects design. Results suggested that humanists defended humanism more in 
the mortality salience condition than in the dental pain condition. However, mortality 
salience did not increase the defense of the normative worldview for normatives. 
Contrary to expectations, humanists and normatives defended their respective worldviews 
to an equivalent extent in the mortality salience condition. Mortality salience did not lead 
to defense of the American worldview for normatives or for humanists. Participants in the 
mortality salience condition, humanists, and normatives did not differ on the number of 
accessible death-thoughts in either the mortality salience or the dental pain condition. 
Despite methodological limitations, this study suggests that, at least for humanists, TMT 
does generalize beyond specific cultural worldviews to overall worldviews.  It also 
indicates that the individual difference variables of being humanist/non-humanist and 
normative/non-normative do not affect the ability of mortality salience to prime death-
thoughts. Rather, being humanist or non-humanist affects worldview defense after the 
death-thoughts have been primed and before distal defenses (i.e., worldview defense) are 
activated. 
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Introduction 
Study Purpose 
After life-threatening events, people tend to reinforce the norms of their culture 
(for a review see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2003). TMT explains these 
behaviors as attempts to buffer the potential for anxiety provoked by being aware of 
one‟s own inevitable mortality (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). In other words, terror 
management is literally the way that people manage the terror of thinking about their own 
deaths. TMT is based on the work of Ernest Becker (1973), who posited that humans 
manage the potentially paralyzing fear caused by knowledge of their own deaths, often 
called existential fear, by developing shared conceptions of reality, or worldviews, which 
offer literal (i.e., belief in an afterlife) and/or symbolic (i.e., contributing to something 
greater or more long lasting than an individual‟s life) immortality. Faith in these 
worldviews protects people from existential fear: (1) by providing meaning, the promise 
of immortality, and standards and values by which one can feel worthwhile, and (2) when 
people believe that they are meeting or surpassing those standards of value (i.e., self-
esteem, which TMT theorists define as the degree to which people believe they are 
meeting or exceeding those standards). Accordingly, TMT researchers have found that: 
(1) when reminded of their mortality, people try to bolster their worldviews and attempt 
to live up to culturally prescribed standards of value (for a review, see Pyszczynski et al., 
2003) and (2) people with naturally high levels of self-esteem and experimentally 
elevated levels of self-esteem show less anxiety and less defense in response to threats 
(e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992). 
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A large body of research has supported the assertion that mortality salience (when 
people are reminded of their mortality) affects a wide range of behaviors (e.g., 
Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, et al., 1990, Greenberg et al., 1995, Pyszczynski et al., 
1996; Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002). TMT theorists purport that, 
because cultural worldviews are preserved by social consensus, the mere presence of 
someone with a different worldview threatens one‟s own worldview by eroding 
consensus (Schimel et al., 1999). A decrease in unanimity allows for the possibility that 
one‟s own worldview is incorrect. Thus, mortality salience should increase general in-
group bias, and this has been found (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). Mortality salience also 
increases endorsement of cultural stereotypes (Schimel et al., 1999).   
Despite research testing alternative explanations for mortality salience effects, 
some holes remain in the theory. TMT posits that mortality salience evokes death-
thoughts. When death-thoughts are first brought into consciousness, proximal defenses, 
such as denial and suppression, are utilized to remove death-thoughts from awareness 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Arndt, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Greenberg et al., 2000). After the death-thoughts fade 
from conscious awareness, but are still accessible through implicit measures, distal 
defenses (including worldview defense) predominate (Greenberg et al., 1994). Please see 
Figure 1, below, for an illustration of the proposed process through which mortality 
salience influences worldview defense.  
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Figure 1. TMT model of defense against death-thoughts (from Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
& Solomon, 1999, p. 840) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Various cognitive and personality processes can influence mortality salience at 
any point between the salience manipulation and worldview defense. Such factors might 
moderate the relationship between mortality salience and evocation of death-thoughts, or 
they might moderate the relationship between death-thoughts and worldview defense. 
More research is needed to determine whether mortality salience priming affects people 
who hold different beliefs differently; that is, whether holding different beliefs affects 
how well death-thoughts are primed.  
Although a significant amount of literature exists to support TMT, several 
researchers have criticized TMT and proposed alternative explanations for mortality 
salience effects (e.g., Snyder, 1997; Navarrete et al., 2004, 2005; Navarrete, 2005). Even 
if the general tenets of TMT are accepted, another weakness in the TMT literature is that 
Death-related thoughts enter awareness 
Proximal defenses, such as suppression & 
rationalization are used 
Increase in death-related thoughts outside 
awareness 
Distal terror management defenses, i.e. 
worldview defense and self-esteem bolstering 
are used 
Death-related thoughts outside awareness are 
reduced and “potential terror is averted” 
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researchers have generally tested worldview defense with rather limited measures (e.g., 
defending a particular value, evaluations of pro- or anti-American essays, or defense of 
one‟s religion (for review see Pyszczynski et al., 2003)). TMT research has defined 
worldviews as shared conceptions of reality, which offer literal (i.e., belief in an afterlife) 
and/or symbolic (i.e., contributing to something greater or more long lasting than an 
individual‟s life) immortality (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Given this definition, a 
worldview could be as specific as a single value, or as large as an ideological system that 
guides all personal beliefs. TMT research has focused on the more specific end of the 
spectrum. However, it has missed measuring worldview as predictive of one‟s values and 
beliefs across areas of life (what I will call one‟s “overall worldview”). Therefore, it is 
unclear whether mortality salience affects defense of one‟s overall worldview or only 
smaller, more specific, parts of one‟s worldview (more in-group bias). Therefore, what is 
needed is a way of investigating people‟s overall worldviews. Tomkins (1963, 1978, 
1987) has proposed a way to do this.  
In order to fill some of the gaps within the TMT literature, the goals of the current 
study are twofold: 1) to determine whether or not the type and magnitude of overall 
worldview held affects how strongly people engage in worldview defense as it is 
typically measured, and 2) to determine whether holding a particular worldview 
moderates the relationship between mortality salience and worldview defense and, if so, 
where in the TMT model that moderation occurs (e.g., whether holding the specific 
worldview affects the ability of mortality salience to prime death-thoughts or only affects 
worldview defense itself).  
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To accomplish these goals, first, the literature that supports TMT is reviewed, 
including evidence of when and why the effects of thinking about mortality occur as well 
as when they do not occur. Next, established critiques of TMT are reviewed, other 
critiques and areas of research that are missing from the TMT literature are more fully 
explored. Following that, the study goals are explained in more detail and the study is 
proposed as a way to improve TMT. Next, the exact methods of the study, including 
study participants, design, and measures, are introduced. After that, the results of the 
study are presented. Finally, the study results will be discussed, both within the context of 
TMT literature and within the greater context of personality, social, and clinical 
psychology. 
Terror Management Theory 
TMT is based on the work of Ernest Becker (1973), who integrates the ideas of 
Sigmund Freud, Soren Kirkegaard, and Otto Rank into a theory revolving around 
humankind‟s dualistic feeling of specialness contrasted with its knowledge of simply 
being another animal that defecates and dies. Thus, Becker (1973, p. 162) posits that most 
human actions are done in an attempt to transcend this animality by balancing two main 
motives: the motive to join into some “larger expansiveness of meaning” so that one does 
not feel “impotent in the face of nature” and the motive to increase one‟s own powers and 
individuality. Becker (1973) proposes that humans can never completely satisfy both 
motives and, thus, will always suffer as part of the human condition; however, acting out 
culturally prescribed hero roles helps one to feel that he/she can “oppose nature and 
transcend it,” thereby denying one‟s “creatureliness” (p. 159). Therefore, acting out and 
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supporting culturally prescribed roles helps people manage their feelings of impotence 
and believe that they are part of something larger and more meaningful than themselves. 
Terror management theorists have interpreted Becker‟s (1973) work to mean that 
humans manage the potentially paralyzing fear caused by knowledge of their own deaths, 
or existential fear, by developing a cultural anxiety buffer made up of two related factors. 
The first factor is a shared conception of reality, or worldview, which gives meaning and 
order to experiences and offers literal and/or symbolic immortality. The second factor is 
self-esteem, which TMT theorists define as the degree to which people believe they are 
meeting or exceeding culturally prescribed standards (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). Thus, people can mitigate potentially incapacitating 
existential terror through gaining meaning and the promise of immortality from their 
worldview and through believing that they are living up to the standards of that 
worldview.  TMT theorists posit that TMT is important not only because of the behaviors 
that it is able to predict and the conditions in which those behaviors occur and do not 
occur, but also because TMT is observable in history and can link social and clinical 
psychology.  
Evidence for TMT 
In accordance with the above premises, TMT researchers have hypothesized and 
found that: (1) when reminded of their mortality, people try to bolster their worldviews 
and attempt to live up to culturally prescribed standards of value and (2) people with 
naturally high levels of self-esteem and experimentally elevated levels of self-esteem 
show less anxiety and less defense in response to threats (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, et 
al., 1992) (for a review, see Pyszczynski et al., 2003). 
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Mortality salience effects. The first hypothesis, that making mortality salient 
should lead to people reinforcing their worldviews and attempting to live up to the values 
of the worldviews (termed worldview defense), is called the mortality salience hypothesis 
(e.g., Rosenblatt et al., 1989). TMT proponents hypothesize that faith in one‟s worldview 
and its effectiveness as an anxiety buffer are reinforced through social consensus, 
knowing that most people share one‟s worldview. However, the existence of people 
holding contradicting worldviews casts doubt on the validity of one‟s own worldview, 
making it a less effective anxiety buffer (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Thus, TMT predicts 
that people will tend to respond positively to others who agree with and uphold their 
worldviews and negatively to those who disagree with or violate them, and these 
tendencies should be magnified by mortality salience. Similarly, it predicts that mortality 
salience will make it more psychologically difficult to violate the values of one‟s 
worldview, for example misusing religious symbols in order to solve a problem. Research 
has supported these predictions (e.g., Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, et al., 1995).  
Rosenblatt and colleagues (1989) asked half of the participants to fill out the 
Mortality Attitudes Personality Survey, which consisted of two open-ended questions 
asking participants “to write about (a) what will happen to them as they physically die, 
and (b) the emotions that the thought of their own death arouses in them” (p. 682). That 
manipulation has become the standard mortality salience manipulation. Rosenblatt and 
colleagues (1989) found that judges and students in the mortality salience condition 
assigned higher bails to hypothetical prostitutes than those in the non-mortality salience 
condition. The difference was not due to mortality salience evoking negative emotions or 
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physiological arousal. Consistent with TMT, only students in the mortality salience 
condition who had negative views of prostitutes prior to the study assigned higher bails. 
After mortality salience, the students also assigned a higher reward to a woman who 
helped police apprehend a dangerous criminal (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).  
Florian and Mikulincer (1997) replicated Rosenblatt and colleagues‟ (1989) 
findings with other moral transgressions, showing that the mortality salience hypothesis 
is generalizable to other cultures (Israeli college students) and that mortality salience 
effects generalize across individual differences in what aspect of death provokes fear. 
However, they also found that mortality salience better predicts judgments against 
lawbreakers with some refinement of the mortality salience hypothesis. Specifically, fear 
of death can be broken down into fear of interpersonal consequences (e.g., loss of social 
identity and worries about consequences to loved ones after death) and fear of 
intrapersonal consequences (e.g., fear of one‟s body decomposing or inability to be self 
fulfilled) (Florian & Kravetz, 1983). Violations of values and morals can also have 
interpersonal or intrapersonal consequences. Mortality salience effects are strongest when 
the type of existential fear and the type of moral transgression are aligned (Florian & 
Mikulincer, 1997). For example, people who more feared the interpersonal consequences 
of death made harsher judgments against people whose transgressions had interpersonal 
consequences (e.g., the driver in a hit-and-run accident that left a 5-year-old daughter 
without parents for a year) (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). 
In addition to judging the actions of others, TMT suggests that acting in ways 
consistent with one‟s worldview is another way of buffering anxiety in the face of 
mortality salience. Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, and colleagues (1995) asked students to 
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solve problems with appropriate objects or with the American flag and a crucifix. 
Mortality salience increased the time to complete the tasks, increased subjective feelings 
of tension during the tasks, and increased reluctance to use the cultural objects 
inappropriately to solve the problems (e.g., a devout Catholic using a cross as a hammer) 
(Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, et al., 1995).  
TMT posits that responses to mortality salience should include two types of 
reactions: 1) reinforcing one‟s own worldview or individual values that are part of one‟s 
worldview through personally living up to those values and judging others‟ compliance, 
and 2) bolstering one‟s worldview through praising people who praise their worldview 
and reacting negatively (by criticizing, rejecting, or aggressing against) to those who 
criticize or disagree with their worldview. Many studies have used responses to essays or 
statements that are pro- and anti- country, place of residence, or political views as 
measures of worldview defense (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; McGregor et al., 1998). In one study, students from the 
USA read pro- American, anti-American, and mixed-view essays (Greenberg et al., 
1990). Each participant read all of the essays, and all of the participants agreed with the 
pro-American author more than the anti-American author. However, mortality salience 
resulted in significant differences in endorsement of the three essays, with (a) greater 
agreement with the pro-American essay than the mixed-view essay and (b) greater 
agreement with the mixed-view essay than the anti-American essay. Mortality salience 
resulted in a corresponding distribution of “liking” of the authors of the three essays. 
Those differences were not found in the non-mortality salience group (Greenberg et al., 
1990; 1994).  
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TMT views worldviews as fragile and only sustained by social consensus; 
therefore mortality salience should raise the degree to which participants believe others 
agree with their worldview. Pyszczynski et al. (1996) showed that this effect occurs when 
mortality is made salient in a natural environment. They interviewed German citizens 
either directly in front of or 100 meters from a funeral parlor, asked them about their 
attitudes towards German immigration policies, and asked them what percentage of the 
German public they thought agreed with them. Participants who were interviewed in 
front of the funeral parlor believed that a higher percentage of people agreed with them 
when compared to people who were interviewed 100 meters away from the funeral parlor 
(non-mortality salience condition). This study was replicated with similar results in 
Colorado Springs, although the participants were asked about their attitudes toward 
teaching Christian values in school rather than about immigration policies (Pyszczynski 
et al., 1996). 
How far would someone go to defend his/her worldview after mortality salience? 
TMT suggests that people will use any available means to bolster their worldview, 
thereby mitigating potentially paralyzing existential terror. Although it would be 
unethical to induce mortality salience and give subjects an opportunity to be violent 
towards others, McGregor and colleagues (1998) were able to measure physical 
aggression in a creative way. They had students fill out “personality” questionnaires that 
included either mortality salience induction or a control condition of thinking about their 
next big exam. Then they told students to write about their political views and then, after 
a delay, presented them with a paragraph that either matched or ridiculed their views. 
Participants were told that the paragraph was written by another participant, and, as part 
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of a supposed second experiment studying taste preferences, that they would give the 
person whose paragraph they read hot sauce to taste. The participants were shown a food 
preferences form that indicated that the target disliked spicy food. As was expected, 
people in the mortality salience condition gave the target who disagreed with their views 
more hot sauce than did participants in any of the other three conditions (McGregor et al., 
1998). In two separate follow-up studies, it was found that, when given the opportunity to 
judge and to evaluate the worldview-threatening author, participants in the mortality 
salience condition did not later aggress with more hot sauce. When given the opportunity 
to aggress with more hot sauce, participants in the mortality salience condition did not 
later evaluate the worldview-threatening author more negatively than did participants in 
the other conditions (McGregor et al., 1998). Although it is questionable whether 
allocating hot sauce and physical aggression can be equated, the results of these studies 
may indicate that denigrating and aggressing against people who threaten one‟s 
worldview are two ways of defending that worldview. It may be that people use whatever 
means are most accessible to bolster their worldview after being reminded of their 
mortality. 
As proposed by TMT, the simple existence of people with other worldviews is 
threatening after mortality salience because their existence opens up the possibility that 
one‟s own worldview may not be correct (and thus may not ensure immortality). For that 
reason, one will have more negative reactions to people who presumably do not share 
one‟s worldview (out-group) and more positive reactions to people who seem to share 
one‟s worldview (in-group). For example, Oschmann and Mathy (1994 as cited in 
Pyszczynski et al., 2003) found that German students in the mortality salience condition, 
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but not in the non-mortality salience condition, rated other German students more 
positively than they rated Turkish students. Mortality salience induction not only seemed 
to affect students‟ opinions, but also seemed to affect their behavior. A follow-up study 
showed that German students in the mortality salience condition sat farther away from a 
Turkish target than a German target in a waiting room. Students in the non-mortality 
salience condition did not sit significantly farther away from either the Turkish or the 
German target (Oschmann & Mathy, 1994 as cited in Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Similarly, 
Greenberg and colleagues (1990) found that, among Christian students, mortality salience 
led to more positive perceptions of another Christian person and to more negative 
perceptions of a Jewish person.  
Although people are more likely to have negative reactions to people in their out-
groups (Greenberg et al., 1990; Oschmann & Mathy, 1994 as cited in Pyszczynski et al., 
2003) and to endorse stereotypes after mortality salience (Schimel et al., 1999), there is at 
least one exception to this rule. However, the exception is also explained by TMT. If 
stereotypes serve, at least in part, to bolster faith in one‟s worldview, then people should 
like members of out-groups who conform to stereotypes better than members of out-
groups who violate stereotypes after mortality salience. This should hold true no matter 
how undesirable the stereotype is, because someone who violates a stereotype challenges 
the validity of one‟s worldview. Indeed, Schimel and colleagues (1999) found that 
participants in the non-mortality salience groups preferred the non-stereotyped minority 
better than the stereotyped minority; however, following mortality salience, participants 
preferred minorities who conformed to stereotypes better than those who violated 
stereotypes (even if by violating the stereotype they fit better with the values of the 
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majority culture). No follow-up study was done assessing whether mortality salience 
produces mirror effects among members of the minority group. The dynamics of 
mortality salience might differ depending on the majority status of one‟s ingroup, such 
that minority members may show a different propensity for stereotyping or liking 
members of the majority. 
The mortality salience effect of negatively evaluating those who do not share 
one‟s worldview may carry over into judgments of culpability. Nelson et al. (1997) asked 
participants to view either a gruesome or a standard driver education video, then had 
them read about a driver who was suing a car company after he was in a car accident, 
then had them assign blame and how much money (if any) the driver should be awarded. 
Participants in the mortality salience condition blamed the Japanese automaker more than 
the American automaker, but company nationality did not affect blame assignment for 
participants in the control condition. This is important because it could have implications 
for the legal system. For example, if lawyers use graphic pictures/videos and/or are able 
to make jurors think about their own deaths, TMT would predict that those jurors would 
be more likely to convict a member of their out-group.  
Although there is a tendency to focus on the negative effects of mortality salience, 
positive effects do exist. Similar to the inclination to reward those who uphold cultural 
values (Rosenblatt et al., 1989) and to having difficulty violating one‟s values 
(Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, et al., 1995) after mortality salience, people should attempt 
to exemplify the attitudes and behaviors prescribed by their cultural worldview. Jonas 
and colleagues (2002) found that citizens of the U.S.A. in the mortality salience group 
gave twice as much to a U.S. charity than did those in the non-mortality salience group. 
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However, in-group bias still occurred to a degree in that, in the mortality salience group, 
more money was given to the domestic charity than to the foreign charity. There was no 
difference between mortality salience and non-mortality salience groups in the amount 
given to a foreign charity (Jonas et al., 2002).  
Why and when mortality salience effects occur. According to TMT, mortality 
salience increases the accessibility of death-thoughts that are outside of conscious 
awareness, and these death-thoughts lead to worldview defense (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Arndt et al., 1997a, Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000). 
Immediately after people concentrate on death-thoughts (i.e., the death-thoughts are in 
conscious awareness), people use proximal defenses, such as denial or suppression, to 
remove death-thoughts from awareness. After the death-thoughts have been removed 
from awareness, but are still detectable through implicit measures, people use distal 
defenses, such as worldview defense to buffer existential anxiety (Greenberg et al., 
1994). This process of using proximal and then distal defenses to deal with conscious and 
non-conscious death-thoughts is called the “dual process model of defense against 
conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts” (Landau, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & 
Greenberg, 2007, p. 482). Greenberg and colleagues (2000) found that, when there was 
no delay after mortality salience induction, direct defense (by biasing one‟s report of 
emotionality to deny one‟s vulnerability to an early death) was higher and worldview 
defense was lower; however, when there was a delay, direct defense was lower and 
worldview defense was higher. Greenberg and colleagues (1994) either had people 
complete the standard mortality salience manipulation or the standard manipulation plus 
writing about their deepest emotions about their death and found that the prolonged, 
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extensive consideration of mortality actually attenuated mortality salience. This seems to 
occur because the death-related thoughts were kept in awareness, and worldview defense 
occurs only if death-related thoughts are accessible, but outside of conscious awareness 
(Greenberg et al., 1994). Immediately after mortality salience induction, accessibility of 
death-related thoughts is low (as measured by a word completion task with a number of 
stems able to be completed with death-related words), but it increases after a distraction. 
Few studies have used a manipulation check to determine that death-thoughts are 
actually evoked after mortality salience induction. However, in two separate studies, 
Greenberg and colleagues (1994) found that, after the standard mortality salience 
inducation, worldview defense occurs and death-related thoughts are evoked. Given 
Greenberg and colleagues‟ (1994) research, TMT theorists propose that death-thoughts 
are a necessary link between mortality salience manipulations and worldview defense. 
Similarly, if death-related thoughts are the instigators of potential anxiety and, thus, 
worldview defense, then it would be predicted that being able to defend one‟s worldview 
after mortality salience induction would decrease the accessibility of death related 
thoughts. Greenberg and colleagues (2000) found exactly that. Death-thoughts (as 
measured through a word completion task) may not only be consciously induced through 
asking people questions about their own deaths (Greenberg et al., 1994; Greenberg et al., 
2000), but may also be induced through subliminal priming (Arndt, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, et al., 1997). Priming using the words “dead” and “pain” resulted in higher 
accessibility of death-related thoughts and amplified worldview defense when compared 
with priming using the words “field” and “pain” (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 
1997).  In a follow-up study, it was found that when participants are aware of the word 
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“death” being flashed, mortality salience effects do not immediately occur. TMT theorists 
posit that this occurs because the death related thoughts need to be outside of one‟s 
central awareness. This is because immediately after people concentrate on thoughts of 
death (i.e., the death-thoughts are in conscious awareness), they use proximal defenses, 
such as denial of vulnerability or suppression, to remove death-thoughts from awareness.  
In order to test whether the removal of death-thoughts from conscious awareness 
is necessary for later worldview defense, Arndt and colleagues (Arndt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997) had participants think about their mortality using 
the standard mortality salience manipulation and tested their accessibility to death related 
thoughts under cognitive loads at different time points. Experimenters presented a 
sequence of 11 numbers for 30 seconds and asked the participants to remember the 
numbers until they were asked to write them down. Participants then filled out a packet 
that contained (in order) “filler items,” mortality salience or control items, a questionnaire 
about affect, a word completion task measuring death-thought accessibility, a 
“distraction” reading passage, and a second word completion task measuring death-
thought accessibility (Arndt et al., 1997, p. 8). Participants were asked to write down the 
numbers either immediately after the filler questionnaire that followed seeing the 
numbers, immediately after the mortality salience manipulation (low cognitive load), 
after the first death-thought accessibility measure (high cognitive load at “Access 1”), or 
after the second death-thought accessibility measure (high cognitive load measured at 
“Access 2”) (Arndt et al., 1997, p. 8). The authors hypothesized that high cognitive load 
disrupts participants‟ ability to suppress death-thoughts; the hypothesis was supported by 
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the finding of an immediate increase in death related thoughts and worldview defense in 
the high cognitive load conditions. 
Besides predicting the behaviors of people who have been thinking about their 
own deaths, TMT has also been able to predict the influence of other cognitive processes 
on mortality salience effects. For example, TMT assumes that existential fear is an 
unconscious fear coming from a desire to survive. It is thus predicted that mortality 
salience effects will be most robust when people are in an experiential mode of thinking, 
marked by greater emotion and less conscious awareness in processing experiences 
(Simon et al., 1997). Given this, it is predicted that mortality salience effects will not 
occur when people are in a rational mode of thinking. Simon and colleagues (1997) 
manipulated participants‟ mode of thinking (through the dress of research assistants and 
wording of questionnaires, which were matched to evoke either experiential or rational 
thinking). Engagement of experiential thinking was confirmed by participant ratings of 
confederate‟s formality. Participants‟ written responses to questions about viewing 
television or mortality also evidenced the activation of experiential versus rational 
thinking in participants. Simon and colleagues (1997) found that mortality salience was 
less likely to lead to worldview defense when participants were in the rational mode of 
thinking. As would be expected, participants in the experiential mode also had more 
accessibility to death related thoughts than did participants in the rational mode of 
thinking.  
In addition to cognitive processes influencing mortality salience effects, many 
individual differences seem to affect mortality salience effects. Data support the assertion 
that people who have a high self-esteem, or who have their self-esteem strengthened, are 
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less vulnerable to anxiety and consequently exhibit less need to buffer against anxiety 
through worldview defense (for a review see, Pyszczynski et al., 2003). For example, 
Greenberg and colleagues (1992) found that both people with high dispositional self-
esteem and people who had their self-esteem artificially bolstered through positive 
personality feedback, experienced less anxiety in response to seeing videos about death 
or expecting to receive a painful shock than people with low dispositional self-esteem or 
those who did not have their self-esteem raised. The second part of the assertion is that, 
given self-esteem‟s ability to buffer anxiety, a higher self-esteem should lessen the need 
for worldview defense. Harmon-Jones and colleagues (1997) found that raising self-
esteem decreases mortality salience effects (they had less negative views of an anti-
U.S.A. essay than did people who received neutral personality feedback). Also, people 
with naturally high self-esteem exhibited less worldview defense than did people with 
naturally moderate or low self-esteem (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997).  
TMT also posits that people defend against existential fear by behaving in ways 
that could enhance their self-esteem. Indeed, Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, and Mikulincer 
(1999) found that following mortality salience, Israeli soldiers who used their driving 
ability as a source of self-esteem took greater driving risks in a simulator than did 
soldiers who did not use driving ability as a source of self-esteem. Additionally, soldiers 
who were given positive feedback about their driving did not drive as recklessly as 
soldiers who were given no feedback (Taubman Ben-Ari et al., 1999). Taken together, 
these studies suggest that self-esteem buffers existential anxiety and the need for 
worldview defense and that people strive to increase self-esteem in order to cope with 
this anxiety. 
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According to TMT, a main purpose of a worldview is to provide literal and 
symbolic immortality. Thus, a belief in immortality should decrease the need for self-
esteem enhancement and worldview defense.  In fact, Dechesne et al. (2002 as cited in 
Pyszczynski et al., 2003) found that, mortality salience leads people to overrate the 
accuracy of positive personality feedback but this tendency is reduced if the participant 
first reads an article with “scientific evidence” of life after death. Symbolic immortality 
(believing that one is contributing to something greater or more long lasting than an 
individual‟s life) is negatively correlated with fear of death (Florian & Mikulincer, 1998) 
and moderates the effects of mortality salience such that the effects are significant in 
people with low scores on symbolic immortality but not in people with high scores on 
symbolic immortality (Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). Florian and Mikulincer (1998) failed 
to provide a manipulation check, so it is unclear whether symbolic immortality modulates 
the ability of mortality salience to evoke death-thoughts or the subsequent need for 
worldview defense after the evocation of death-thoughts. Jonas and Fischer (2006) 
hypothesized that religion would play a role in managing terror, due to the centrality of 
literal and symbolic death transcendence in most religions. They did find that people who 
were intrinsically religious (their religion permeates all aspects of their lives) and who 
had an opportunity to reaffirm those religious beliefs demonstrated less death-thought 
accessibility and less worldview defense (defense of Munich as a place to live). However, 
belief in literal and/or symbolic immortality and religion seems to be part of one‟s 
worldview, and no studies have tested whether an attack on those aspects of one‟s 
worldview leads to increased mortality salience effects. It also seems that no one has 
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addressed whether, within the intrinsically religious, it is the belief in immortality or the 
prolonged consideration of mortality (or both) that attenuates mortality salience effects. 
Attachment style is another factor that mediates the effects of mortality salience. 
There have been multiple ways of conceptualizing adult attachment styles (e.g., 
Bartholomer, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Most research that has investigated the 
relationship between TMT and adult attachment styles has categorized adult attachment 
into three styles based on how people typically feel in close relationships. In close 
relationships, securely attached individuals feel trust, companionship, and positive 
feelings. Avoidant individuals generally feel distrust and fear intimacy. Finally, an 
anxious-ambivalent individual typically fears abandonment and ruminates on attempting 
to become one with his/her partner while feeling anxious and unsure about that partner‟s 
true feelings (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Bowlby (1969) posited that attachment is the main 
way that children obtain security from parents (or the main caregivers). Similarly, Becker 
(1971) proposed that self-esteem begins developing by living up to parental standards, 
and, later, continues through living up to values of the culture and of significant others.  
Thus, one would expect that people who are securely attached would seek out affiliation 
and close relationships but would not need to defend their cultural worldviews. This is 
exactly what Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger (2002) and Taubman–Ben-Ari, Findler, 
& Mikulincer (2002) found. 
Hypothesizing that symbolic immortality is related to mortality salience effects 
(through fear of death), Florian and Mikulincer (1998) investigated whether attachment 
style was related to self-reported symbolic immortality and fear of death. Indeed, they 
found that symbolic immortality was related to less fear of death only in securely 
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attached individuals. In contrast, higher symbolic immortality was related to higher fear 
of death in avoidant individuals (Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). This suggests that 
individual difference variables such as attachment style and belief in symbolic 
immortality are interconnected and may be most helpful in understanding how people 
manage existential fear when examined in combination rather than individually.  
This research suggests that symbolic immortality is related to mortality salience 
effects and that, in securely attached individuals, conscious fear of death is attenuated by 
a belief in symbolic immortality (Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). However, Florian and 
Mikulincer‟s (1998) findings were based on self-reported, conscious, fear of death. 
Worldview defense occurs when death-thoughts are outside of conscious awareness. 
Therefore, this study left unclear whether attachment style, or a combination of 
attachment style and symbolic immortality, may moderate mortality salience effects.  
To begin to address this question, Mikulincer and Florian (2000) investigated 
whether attachment style was related to mortality salience effects. They found that 
securely attached individuals did not engage in worldview defense and evinced greater 
desire for closeness following mortality salience relative to non-securely attached 
individuals (although it is possible that seeking closeness is the worldview defense of 
securely attached individuals). The authors did a check to ensure that individuals in all 
attachment categories had increases in death-thought accessibility and found that all of 
the individuals showed an increase in death-thought accessibility after a delay 
(Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). However, anxious-ambivalent individuals also showed 
heightened access to death-thoughts before the delay task. Mikulincer and Florian (2000) 
believe that this occurred because anxious-ambivalent individuals cannot suppress death-
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thoughts, due to the propensity to ruminate on anxiety provoking subjects. In fact, 
worldview defense did not decrease death-thought accessibility in anxious-ambivalent 
individuals, whereas it did reduce accessibility to death-thoughts in avoidant individuals 
(Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). 
Another individual difference that moderates mortality salience effects is 
authoritarianism. Greenberg and colleagues (1990) investigated the possible relationship 
between authoritarianism and worldview defense following mortality salience. According 
to Adorno et al., 1950 (as cited in Greenberg et al., 1990), the authoritarian personality 
develops as a defense to fears and is marked by an increased respect for authority, a 
disdain for the disadvantaged, and a conventional and inflexible cognitive style. 
Greenberg and colleagues (1990) used this framework to extend TMT and suggested that 
high authoritarianism develops to defend against the fear of death and plays a significant 
part in worldview defense; therefore, high authoritarians should respond especially 
negatively to dissimilar others after mortality has been made salient. Greenberg and 
colleagues (1990) found that mortality salience led to the negative evaluation of 
dissimilar others in high authoritarians but not in low authoritarians; high and low 
authoritarians did not differ in their negative evaluations in the absence of mortality 
salience. This indicates that, for high authoritarians, disparaging dissimilar others helps 
defend against existential anxiety, whereas low authoritarians are able to protect 
themselves from existential anxiety without disparaging dissimilar others. However, it 
may be that tolerance of dissimilar others is part of the worldviews of individuals who are 
low in authoritarianism; therefore, espousing tolerance may be one way of defending 
their worldview (Greenberg et al., 1990).   
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One more individual difference that moderates mortality salience effects is 
political liberalism. Greenberg et al. (1992) found that political liberals did not devalue 
dissimilar others after mortality salience but political conservatives did. In fact, political 
liberals evaluated dissimilar others more favorably after mortality salience than they did 
in the control condition. Again, this is likely because tolerance and open-mindedness are 
part of liberals‟ worldview; therefore, by acting consistently with the liberal worldview, 
they are defending that worldview. Greenberg and colleagues (1990) believed that out-
group exclusion could work differently in the United States because freedom and 
democracy are important cultural values in the USA, and the authors assumed that 
freedom and democracy include the value of tolerance. Greenberg and colleagues primed 
tolerance in half of the American participants (both liberal and conservative) and, 
concordant with their previous results, found that individuals who were primed with 
thinking about the value of tolerance did not disparage dissimilar others after mortality 
salience. This indicates that values of one‟s worldview that are salient at the time of 
considering one‟s death regulate people‟s responses to mortality salience. 
Historical examples. Many events throughout history are consistent with the 
hypotheses of TMT. Perhaps most salient in our minds are the events of 9/11/01, when 
al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked 4 planes, which they crashed into the World Trade Center in 
Manhattan, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania, bringing down the World Trade 
Center and killing nearly 3,000 people. The events of 9/11 were potent reminders of our 
mortality. Pyszczynski and colleagues (2003) cited varying research to show that 
Americans used both proximal and distal defenses to cope with this existential fear after 
9/11. As would be expected, during and immediately after 9/11, people used the proximal 
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defense of trying to get rid of thoughts of their own deaths either by suppressing thoughts 
of death (by distracting themselves and doing things to reduce vulnerability) or by 
denying their vulnerability. For example, Valhov and colleagues (2002) found that nearly 
25% of those surveyed in Manhattan a month after 9/11 reported increased use of 
alcohol. Later, people used the distal defense of seeking confirmation of and bolstering 
their own beliefs, as seen in increased religious service attendance and amplified 
patriotism and nationalism (Lampman, 2001 as cited in Pyszczynski et al., 2003). They 
also used distal defenses such as raging against those who challenged those beliefs, as 
seen in the hostile reactions to people who said the U.S.A. brought the attacks on 
themselves and in increased bigotry especially against Muslims and people of Middle 
Eastern decent. (Pyszczynski et al., 2003) 
 The Israeli people‟s reactions to terrorist attacks are also consistent with TMT. 
Berrebi and Klor (2008) looked at the 5 national elections from 1988 to 2003 in Israel. 
When terrorist attacks occur within three months of an election, there is an overall 
increase in support for the Likud and other right-leaning parties by .045 percentage points 
per terror fatality (Berrebi & Klor, 2008). With an average of three deaths per terror 
attack, they conclude that there is a significant increase in support for the right block of 
political parties after each terror attack. The right leaning parties emphasize tradition and 
take a hard-line on security of the nation, so TMT would predict this effect. TMT also 
predicts what happens when the original political leanings of a territory are taken into 
consideration. In general, terrorist attacks within three months of elections are related to a 
polarization of the Israeli electorate, such that terrorist attacks increase support for the 
right block of political parties in areas that already lean right but decrease support for the 
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right block in areas that generally lean left (Berrebi & Klor, 2008).  However, the 
increase in support for the right block is stronger when the location of the attacks is closer 
to one‟s home, and when terror attacks with a large number of fatalities occur in left-
leaning localities, there is still an increase in support for the right political block (Berrebi 
& Klor, 2008). This suggests either that a desire for security may out-weigh bolstering 
one‟s worldview or that there is a more subtle way of measuring worldview that would 
have better captured defense of the worldviews of left-leaning citizens.   
Critiques: Alternative Explanations 
Despite the impressive literature supporting TMT, the worldview defense effects 
accounted for by TMT may be better explained by other theoretical frameworks. 
Proponents of Control Theory, Evolutionary Psychology, and Coalitional Psychology 
have all offered alternative theories to explain mortality salience effects. 
Control theory. For example, Snyder (1997) proposes that mortality salience 
effects are based on a need for control. Snyder defines control as “a cognitive model 
whereby people strive to comprehend the contingencies in their lives so as to attain 
desired outcomes and avoid undesirable ones” (1997, p. 48). He argues that the definition 
of cultural worldview that TMT researchers use can be fully explained in terms of 
control. A cultural worldview provides meaning, a way of understanding the world and 
one‟s position in the world. Snyder explains that this information is what people use to 
understand their environment and the “contingencies therein” (p. 48). Similarly, the 
standards and values of a cultural worldview reflect the rules that let people predict and 
control their own and others‟ behavior. Snyder proposes that self-esteem comes from 
having a perceived sense of control of the self.  
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If cultural worldview is really a structure for control, then worldview defense 
occurs when people feel a lack of control. The need for control leads individuals to 
defend worldview inasmuch as such defense reinstates a sense of control, to the extent 
that worldview allows a sense that one can avoid negative outcomes and acquire positive 
outcomes. Although TMT and control theory explain many of the same phenomena, 
Snyder (1997) argues that control theory both explains more phenomena more accurately 
and is more parsimonious than TMT. For example, Snyder (1997) contends that although 
increases in self-esteem do seem to decrease mortality salience effects, “these 
manipulations of self-esteem are based on an enhancement of perceived control” (p. 49). 
Snyder provides another example, arguing that TMT would suggest that people are 
driven to survive no matter what. However, when people are suffering and attempts to 
assuage the pain are unsuccessful (e.g., terminal cancer, or chronic Major Depressive 
Disorder), many seek to end their lives (Snyder, 1994). In this case, control of pain and 
suffering overcomes the drive to survive.  
Evolutionary psychology. Buss (1997) similarly finds fault with the drive for 
survival present in TMT. He additionally argues that TMT is consistent with an outdated 
evolutionary psychology that does not explain a myriad of phenomena as well as modern 
evolutionary psychology does. For example, he cites evidence that reproduction, not 
survival, propels evolution and human motivation and that survival is only important in 
its role in promoting reproduction. TMT stresses the importance of worldview defense 
having evolved in order for people to adapt and to function. However, TMT focuses on 
psychological protection and ignores if and how worldview defense would aid in solving 
the problems of actual survival and reproduction. For that matter, TMT does not explain 
27 
 
why existential anxiety would have evolved or how an anxiety buffer would have 
evolved. If anxiety evolved to help survival/reproduction in response to threats, then 
natural selection should deselect systems that block anxiety.  Beyond problems of TMT 
not fitting into modern evolutionary psychology, despite its claim to do so, Buss (1997) 
states that evidence exists suggesting that phenomena that TMT does explain, such as 
managing self-presentation and in-group identification and bias, do not solely exist to 
reduce existential anxiety. Rather, these phenomena seem to exist for goals of actual 
survival and reproduction.  
Navarrete and Fessler (2005) echo Buss‟ (1997) criticism of TMT and 
additionally state that a survival instinct per se could not have evolved because natural 
selection only influences mechanisms to solve specific adaptive problems. So humans 
evolved to avoid numerous separate types of dangers (such as cliffs and lions), not to 
avoid death in general. Anxiety is part of humans‟ affective system that helps prompt 
appropriate action when confronted with adaptive challenges; thus, anxiety does not 
inhibit one‟s ability to function, but rather enhances it. If an overabundance of anxiety 
existed for people in a certain circumstance, in this case fear about dying, then evolution 
should have selected for a reduction in the anxiety instead of forming a separate system 
to buffer the extreme anxiety.  
Coalitional psychology. Conforming to cultural standards and norms engenders 
increased social cohesion and cooperation (Navarrete, Kursban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 
2004). Therefore, worldview defense makes sense in the context of evolving to solve 
adaptive challenges rather than evolving to buffer possibly incapacitating existential 
anxiety. Mortality salience prompts worldview defense because successfully gaining 
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social support in the face of mortal threats (e.g., illness, starvation, severe injury) would 
have increased the likelihood of survival. Similarly, negative responses towards out-
group members are likely when competition for resources, which are necessary for the 
continuation of the in-group, is pertinent (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005). Therefore, salience 
of existential anxiety does not uniquely cause worldview defense, but it is actually one of 
many adaptive challenges that require actual defense against a threat and, thus, require 
coalitional thinking and action.  
If fitness adaptation is the overarching construct that matters in obtaining in-group 
bias effects, then all adaptive challenges should produce the same results as mortality 
salience (Navarrete et al., 2004). To test this, Navarrete and colleagues placed college 
students with strong American identities into either mortality salience, theft salience, 
social-isolation salience, or a control condition. Pro-American bias emerged in the 
mortality salience and theft-salience conditions. Additionally, there was an interaction 
between authoritarianism and condition, such that pro-American bias was higher in each 
experimental condition versus the control when authoritarianism was high, but there were 
no differences between conditions when authoritarianism was low. In their next study, 
Navarrete and colleagues (2004) found that the in-group bias found in their first study 
was not due to increased death-thoughts in the theft or social-isolation conditions. They 
repeated their first study in Costa Rica and found that pro-Costa Rican bias was 
significantly higher than the control group in the theft and social-isolation salience groups 
but not in the mortality salience group. Collectivism moderated the relationship between 
challenge and pro-American bias. Pro-American bias emerged only under high 
collectivism but was evoked similarly by mortality salience, social isolation, or home 
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construction (Navarrete, 2005). These results may indicate that coalitional theory better 
explains mortality salience effects across cultures; however, further research is necessary 
before this conclusion is drawn, as research supporting TMT has come from at least 13 
countries with varying levels of collectivism (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). 
Some observations that have been used to support TMT may be better explained 
by coalitional psychology. For example, Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, and Simon 
(1996) had participants view slides of paintings by two different artists and rate the art. 
They then made mortality salient and had the participants rate themselves, members of 
the group that had the same artistic preference as themselves, and members of the group 
that had the different artistic preference. In the mortality salience condition, people 
reported those in their in-group more positively than those in their out-group. Harmon-
Jones and colleagues (1996) claim that these results support TMT because even arbitrary 
groups can be used to feel comparatively superior, i.e. boost self-esteem, when faced with 
thoughts about dying. However, TMT‟s definition of self-esteem is how well one 
believes he/she is living up to culturally prescribed values, not a comparison of one‟s 
group to another group. The results seem to fit better with Navarrete and colleagues‟ 
(2004, 2005) coalitional theory. When faced with death, people rate seemingly arbitrary 
in-group members as higher because forming a coalition with them may help them cope 
with adaptive challenges that could lead to death. 
Another example of research supposedly supporting TMT that may be better 
explained by coalitional theory is Landau, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon‟s (2002 
as cited in Pyszczynski et al., 2003) study. They found that reminders of death one month 
after 9/11 led American college students, even those who normally do not feel they buy 
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into the American worldview, to respond more negatively to someone who suggested that 
the terrorists might have had a legitimate reason for doing what they did. Landau and 
colleagues (2002 as cited in Pyszczynski et al., 2003) purport that this supports TMT. 
However, if people who generally feel at odds with the American worldview are reacting 
against their normal worldview in this situation, then that would support a coalitional 
view of in-group bias. This confound highlights the need to find a way to measure 
worldview defense separately from trying to bolster belonging to one‟s in-group. 
Navarrete and Fessler (2005) claim that coalitional psychology not only is 
consistent with modern evolutionary theory, but also accounts for research results that are 
inconsistent with TMT. For example, Taubman, Ben-Ari and colleagues (2003) found 
that mortality salience increased willingness to initiate social interactions, lowered 
sensitivity to rejection, and increased perceived interpersonal competence, but only in 
securely attached individuals. It may be that people who are securely attached know that 
they can count on others when facing adaptive challenges and so seek out that support, 
whereas those who are not securely attached do not believe people will be there for them 
when they need them, and so they may not even try to seek out support. This fits with 
Mikulincer and Florian‟s (2000) findings (previously discussed in more detail) that 
securely attached individuals did not engage in worldview defense and evinced greater 
desire for closeness following mortality salience relative to non-securely attached 
individuals. 
TMT theorists Landau, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2007) do not 
accept criticisms that claim TMT does not fit with evolutionary theory, nor do they 
believe that coalitional psychology explains the variety of findings that support TMT. 
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They agree with Navarrete and Fessler (2005) that using the wording of “self-
preservation instinct” may not be useful. However, Landau and colleagues (2007) believe 
that it is useful to consider all living organisms as “oriented towards self-preservation and 
reproduction,” given that it is the higher survival rates and reproductive success of 
organisms with specific characteristics that determine whether those characteristics 
spread throughout a population (p. 488). Landau and colleagues also grant that humans 
likely do not have one instinctual mechanism formed to avoid death; however, we do 
have the knowledge that we are alive, that we want to keep living, that many things may 
kill us, and that we will eventually die, and such knowledge affects our very adaptive and 
flexible approach/avoidance predispositions. Similarly, Landau and colleagues agree with 
Navarrete and Fessler that fear/anxiety evolved to help organisms adapt to their 
environments; however, that does not mean that fear/anxiety is adaptive in all 
circumstances. Landau and colleagues (2007) believe that existential anxiety is not 
adaptive but was not selected against by natural selection because it is a byproduct of 
cognitive capacities (such as episodic memory, language, and self-consciousness) and 
specific fears of whatever threatens humans‟ lives, and these cognitive capacities and 
fears are generally highly adaptive.  
According to Becker (1973), people control their existential anxiety with faith in 
worldviews, which helps people understand events related to survival by explaining them 
within a system of meaning and order and by giving people hope of transcending death 
(Landau et al., 2007). A belief in death transcendence is characteristic of nearly all 
cultures and is not explained well by coalitional psychology. Landau and colleagues 
(2007) question why the supernatural would be found in almost all cultures if worldviews 
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are solely meant to show belonging to a group. Landau and colleagues (2007) 
additionally argue that 1) coalitional psychology does not explain why worldview 
defense often involves defending “systems of abstract meaning” that are not related to 
specific life-threatening situations; 2) coalitional psychology ignores the dual process 
model of how mortality salience effects are generated and does not provide an alternative 
cognitive model that would account for findings supporting the dual process model; 3) 
the experiments supporting coalitional psychology “do not provide compelling or unique 
support for CP;” and, 4) coalitional psychology cannot account for many of the findings 
that support TMT hypotheses (p. 496). Navarrete and Fessler capitalized on the fact that 
the majority of TMT research does not distinguish between in-group identification/out-
group exclusion and worldview defense. Landau and colleagues (2007) argue that this 
has been addressed, and that coalitional psychology cannot explain the results. For 
example, coalitional psychology cannot explain why mortality salience leads to increased 
group identification when that identification is associated with increasing self-esteem, but 
leads to decreased group identification when such identification is associated with 
decreasing self-esteem (Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002; 
Dechesne, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2000).  
Methodological problems. Even if we decide to accept TMT‟s explanation of 
when and why mortality salience effects occur despite the criticism, it is important to 
recognize the methodological problems present in some of its supporting research. For 
example, where and how do individual differences in self-esteem, liberalism, intrinsic 
religiosity, authoritarianism, and attachment style (secure, avoidant, or anxious-
ambivalent) fit in the TMT model? Landau and colleagues (2007) state that these 
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individual difference variables moderate mortality salience effects. It seems that, with the 
exception of self-esteem, existing TMT literature ignores the question of how individual 
difference variables moderate the relationship between mortality salience and worldview 
defense. Trait self-esteem seems to moderate the relationship between conscious death-
thought activation and proximal defenses such as denial of one‟s vulnerability to death 
(Greenberg et al., 1993). Other individual difference variables could moderate the 
relationship between mortality salience and conscious or non-conscious death-thought 
activation, the relationship between non-conscious death-thoughts and the activation of 
worldview components, or the relationship between activated worldview components and 
use of the defenses that increase self-esteem and meaning (See Figure 1 on p. 3 for 
illustration of the trajectory of terror managment). The individual difference variables 
may enter the model at different points. For example, although trait self-esteem seems to 
moderate the relationship between conscious death-thought activation and proximal 
defenses, authoritarianism may moderate the relationship between activation of 
worldview components and distal defenses. It would be easy to imagine intrinsic 
religiosity acting similarly to self-esteem, with a strong enough faith buffering the need 
even for proximal defenses against death-thoughts; however, it is also possible that 
intrinsic religiosity alone bolsters one‟s worldview enough that once worldview 
components are activated, distal defenses (e.g., worldview defense) are unnecessary. 
Future research should investigate these hypotheses to clarify how individual difference 
variables fit into the terror management model. 
Part of the problem of how individual differences affect mortality salience may be 
explained by priming. However, there is a dearth of research that could indicate whether 
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mortality salience priming affects people who hold different beliefs differently; that is, 
whether holding different beliefs affects how well death-thoughts are primed. People with 
liberal political orientations and those who have had the value of tolerance primed as part 
of their worldview show fewer mortality salience effects than do conservatives 
(Greenberg et al., 1992). However, it is difficult to know whether this is due to 
liberalism‟s being the salient worldview that needs to be defended or because thinking 
about the importance of liberalism buffers the death-thoughts that instigate worldview 
defense. This question could be answered at least partially by testing whether mortality 
salience elicits death-thoughts as effectively for liberals as for conservatives.  
Although self-esteem and attachment style are convincing individual difference 
variables, liberalism/conservatism, intrinsic religiosity, and authoritarianism could be 
seen as either individual difference variables that moderate the process between mortality 
salience and worldview defense, or as worldviews in themselves. As has been suggested 
by Navarrete and Fessler (2005), if liberalism is a worldview, then defense of that 
worldview may take the form of tolerating those who hold differing opinions from our 
own. However, if it is an individual difference moderator variable, it would need to enter 
the model before distal defenses are engaged.  
Missing piece- measurement of overall worldview. A major problem with the 
existing literature on TMT is its measurement of worldview defense. Worldview defense 
has been measured by defense of particular values or beliefs (e.g., Rosenblatt et al., 1989; 
Greenberg et al., 1995; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; McGregor et al., 1998; Schimel et 
al., 1999), defense of one‟s nationality (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990 and Pyszczynski et 
al., 1996), preference for one‟s own nationality (e.g., Oschmann, & Mathy, 1994 as cited 
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in Pyszczynski et al., 2003), donation to one‟s own versus a foreign charity (e.g., Jonas et 
al., 2002), blame and dislike of those who are not part of one‟s ingroup (e.g., Nelson et 
al., 1997), and defense of one‟s religion (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). TMT research has 
defined worldviews as shared conceptions of reality, which offer literal and/or symbolic 
immortality (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). As mentioned previously, using this definition, a 
worldview could be as specific as a single value, or as large as an ideological system that 
guides all personal beliefs. TMT research has focused on the more specific end of the 
spectrum while missing the most general end of the spectrum. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether mortality salience affects defense of one‟s overall worldview or only smaller, 
more specific, parts of one‟s worldview. It is also unclear whether a person‟s overall 
worldview affects mortality salience effects.  Given this, a way of investigating people‟s 
overall worldviews is necessary. The Tomkins‟ Polarity Scale (1964) is a way to measure 
one‟s overall way of looking at the world, and, thus, it can be used as a way to investigate 
people‟s overall worldviews.  
Tomkins‟ (1987) script theory proposes a way to understand people‟s overall 
worldviews, using somewhat different language than TMT theorists. Personal ideology is 
an individual‟s belief system about how people should live their lives and what factors 
affect how humans live. In other words, it is a person‟s overall worldview, which covers 
“political orientation, religiosity, value systems, morality, child-rearing philosophy,” 
assumptions about human nature, “other value-laden components of personality” (de St. 
Aubin, 1996, p. 152), and ties that worldview to behavioral decisions (Lindeman & 
Sirelius, 2001). According to Tomkins‟ script theory (1987), the orthogonal dimensions 
of humanism and normativism can explain individual and group ideologies (Tomkins, 
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1987). De St. Aubin (1996, 1999) has found that one‟s levels of humanism and 
normativism are predictive of one‟s emotions and religious beliefs, in addition to one‟s 
political orientation. 
Tomkins (1978, 1987) explains the personal ideologies of humanism and 
normativism through his script theory, which posits that personality is best explained as a 
story line made up of scenes which are organized by “sets of rules” called scripts (1987, 
p. 148). A scene is any experienced occurrence in a person‟s life that has a recognizable 
beginning and end, at least one affect, and an object (generally either the activator of the 
affect(s), or a response to the activator or to the affect) (Tomkins, 1978). Tomkins (1978) 
stressed the importance of biological, innate affects. An affect generates sensory 
feedback from the face, voice, and other areas of the body which “makes good things 
better or bad things worse…” and are “intensely rewarding or punishing” (p. 203). 
Carlson (1982) clarified this definition by explaining that there are three types of affects: 
1) positive, inherently rewarding affects such as joy, excitement, and enjoyment; 2) 
negative, inherently punishing affects, such as fear, anger, or disgust; and, 3) neutral 
affects such as interest or surprise. Therefore, one‟s experiences of scenes are amplified 
by affects (Tomkins, 1987). For example, a hungry baby who successfully latches onto 
and gets milk from his/her mother has the reward of satisfying hunger amplified by 
affects of excitement and enjoyment (Tomkins, 1987). However, not all amplified scenes 
are integrated into scripts. Transient scenes, such as hearing a car honk at you and 
becoming startled, may be affect-laden, but do not influence and are not easily connected 
to other scenes (Tomkins, 1978). However, scripts are formed when perceived 
relationships among scenes create experiential patterns (Tomkins, 1978).  
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A script is a set of “ordering rules used for the interpretation, evaluation, 
prediction, production or control of scenes” (Tomkins, 1987, p. 153). Although scenes 
construct a script, over time the rules of the script influence the experience of a scene 
(Tomkins, 1978). Therefore, scripts give meaning to experiences. Scripts are necessarily 
incomplete, ever-changing, self-validating, variable in their accuracy/usefulness in 
dealing with scenes, and are variable in their complexity and in their connectedness with 
other scripts (Tomkins, 1987). For example, a “commitment script validates the 
importance and necessity of the struggle,” but actually achieving what one is committed 
to may make that commitment script unnecessary or may mean that the script needs 
redefining (Tomkins, 1987, p. 153). There are an unlimited number of scripts in a 
person‟s life, and, although Tomkins (Tomkins, 1987) delineated numerous classes of 
scripts, there cannot be any hierarchical classification system for scripts. Some of the 
main categories of scripts include: the “affect management scripts,” “limitation 
remediation” scripts, which “address those aspects of the human condition perceived to 
be imperfect” that can and must be changed, “nuclear” scripts, which address unsolvable 
situations that one is compelled to solve, and “ideological scripts” (Tomkins, 1987, pp. 
160, 166, 168). Within these major categories of scripts, there can be numerous 
subcategories of scripts.  
However, ideological scripts are “the most important class of scripts” because 
they provide experience with “value and affect” by endeavoring to give information 
about how one fits into the universe and his/her society, what one‟s central values are, 
how to achieve those values, “sanctions” for the achievement, transgression, and 
“justification” of those values, and information about how life should be lived and 
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celebrated (Tomkins, 1987, p. 170). All of these pieces are synthesized by emotional 
patterns, included as part of the scripts, which have developed from birth to order one‟s 
relationship to and experience of the world (Tomkins, 1987). Ideological scripts may be 
shared to some extent, such as in religions or in political parties, yet each person‟s scripts 
are unique because individuals are exposed to unique experiences. Therefore, ideological 
scripts are both able to bond people together as well as to divide them (Tomkins, 1987). 
Personal and group ideologies can be understood along the two orthogonal 
dimensions of humanism and normativism (de St. Aubin, 1996; Tomkins, 1963). A 
humanistic orientation regards human experience “as the source of all meaning and 
value;” whereas, a normative orientation believes that reality, including standards and 
values, is universal and is not qualified by human circumstances or experiences and that 
meaning is found in those standards (Stone & Schaffner, p. 18, 1997; de St. Aubin, 1996; 
Tomkins, 1963). Out of this overarching difference comes the three main factors that 
differentiate humanism from normativism (Stone & Schaffner, 1997). First, humanism 
sees human nature as essentially good, whereas normativism sees human nature as 
essentially deficient and weak. Second, humanism accepts human experiences as they are 
perceived, whereas normativism evaluates and judges experiences based on external 
standards. Third, humanism encourages unfettered emotional responses to experiences, 
whereas normativism generally encourages inhibition of emotions (Stone & Schaffner, 
1997).  In other words, a humanist is more oriented towards human feelings and emotions 
whereas a normative values cognitions and judgments (Tomkins, 1987). 
 The differences between humanism and normativism can be found in attitudes 
about numerous areas, including: metaphysics, theology, mathematics, philosophy, 
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psychology, politics, art, theories of parenting, theories of education, and theories of 
value (Tomkins, 1963). For example, in metaphysics, humanists purport that reality is 
solely based on human perceptions, whereas normatives believe that reality exists outside 
of human experience (de St. Aubin, 1996; Tomkins, 1963). In child rearing, humanists 
tend to encourage uniqueness and displaying emotions, such as in attachment parenting, 
whereas normatives tend to try to make their children fit expected norms and do not 
allow their children to show emotions (de St. Aubin, 1996; Tomkins, 1963). Although 
Tomkins (1987) calls the theory explaining humanism and normativism polarity theory, 
this is really a misnomer. It is important to recognize that humanism and normativism are 
orthogonal dimensions. It is possible to be high both in humanism and in normativism, 
high in only one, low in both, or any combination thereof (Stone, 1986).  
Outside of Tomkins‟ own research, few empirical studies exist that test the theory 
of polarity in personal ideology; however, in the studies that do exist, support has been 
found for the usefulness of polarity theory (e.g., de St. Aubin, 1996; Carlson & Brincka, 
1987; Carlson & Levy, 1970). As would be expected, people whose personal ideologies 
are relatively high in humanism believe humans are essentially trustworthy, whereas 
people whose personal ideologies are relatively high in normativism see humans as 
essentially selfish (de St. Aubin, 1996). Humanists are more liberal and vote for more 
Democrats than do normatives. Humanists see God more as a force within humans than 
as an external rule-enforcing power, but normatives do not see God as existing within 
humans. Additionally, people high in humanism place higher priority on the values of 
imagination, interpersonal intimacy, and beauty in nature and the arts, and low priority on 
being clean and polite; whereas, people whose personal ideologies are relatively high in 
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normativism place higher priority on values of being socially recognized, polite, and 
being clean, and low priority on imagination (de St. Aubin, 1996). Carlson and Levy 
(1970) found that humanists are more interpersonally oriented while normatives are more 
individually oriented. Humanists are more likely than normatives to judge ambiguous 
emotional faces as experiencing positive affects; however, normatives who consider 
themselves to be interpersonally oriented see positive affect as much as humanists who 
consider themselves to be individually oriented). Additionally, humanists respond with 
more emotions to a lecture than do normatives (Carlson & Levy, 1970).  
Polarity theory may have other applications as well. Having a highly humanistic 
or normative personal ideology may influence one‟s reasons for choosing to eat certain 
foods. For example, humanists tend to choose their foods based on what will help 
preserve nature and life (which they hold dear) and what is pleasurable to eat, while 
normatives tend to eat based on what they have been told is healthy (Lindeman & 
Sirelius, 2001). People who are unfamiliar with this theory can recognize polarity theory 
within politics. College students and community adults were asked to “cast” Democratic 
and Republican candidates in different plots including triads of humanistic or normative 
affects (Carlson & Brincka, 1987). Regardless of one‟s personal ideology, participants 
cast Democrats in more plots with humanistic affects and Republicans in more plots with 
normative affects (Carlson & Brincka, 1987).  
The Current Study 
The goals of the current study are twofold: 1) to determine whether or not the type 
and magnitude of overall worldview held affects how strongly people engage in 
worldview defense as it is typically measured, and 2) to determine whether holding a 
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particular worldview moderates the relationship between mortality salience and 
worldview defense and, if so, where in the TMT model that moderation occurs (e.g., 
whether holding the specific worldview affects the ability of mortality salience to prime 
death-thoughts or only affects worldview defense itself).  
Given the wide scope of Tomkins‟ polarity theory, it could easily be used to make 
clear whether mortality salience affects the defense of people‟s overall worldviews/value 
systems. Although adding to the TMT research by investigating this overall worldview 
versus more specific worldviews investigated in previous research, the first prediction 
duplicates previous research, that mortality salience will lead to worldview defense. More 
specifically: 1) for humanists (participants high in humanism), mortality salience will 
increase the defense of the humanist worldview above and beyond what a control 
condition (dental pain) would, and 2) for normatives (participants high in normativism), 
mortality salience will increase the defense of the normative worldview above and 
beyond what a control condition would.  
Our third hypothesis does not directly follow from previous literature but is a 
logical extension of the literature. Past research has suggested that securely attached 
individuals do not engage in worldview defense (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000), nor do 
those who value tolerance (Greenberg et al., 1992).  However, that past research has not 
investigated what would happen if those views of trust and tolerance were the ones 
attacked after mortality salience. Trust and tolerance are not, in themselves, worldviews; 
however, given that people who have a humanistic worldview are more trusting of others 
and see the good in all human beings, it would be predicted that humanism would be 
related to secure attachment style and to tolerance. TMT would assert that a direct attack 
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on one‟s worldview after mortality salience would result in worldview defense. Thus, it is 
expected that 3) humanists will defend the humanist worldview less strongly than 
normatives will defend the normative worldview (in other words, there will be a stronger 
effect for normativism defense by normatives versus non-normatives in the mortality 
salience condition than for humanism defense by humanists versus non-humanists in the 
mortality salience condition).  
Given that people who are high in normativism believe that meaning is found in 
standards and values that are the same for everyone, it is likely that an attack on any part 
of that worldview would be met with resistance, especially after mortality salience. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that 4) mortality salience will lead to defense of the 
American worldview for normatives (normatives will rate the pro- American essay more 
positively than the anti- American essay in the mortality salience condition than in the 
non-mortality salience condition). However, following from the logic given from 
hypotheses 1-3, 5) mortality salience will not lead to defense of the American worldview 
for humanists (humanists‟ defense of the American WV will not be influenced by 
mortality salience).   
Greenberg and colleagues (1992) suggested that liberals do not devalue people 
with anti-liberal views after mortality salience because liberals value tolerance; therefore, 
tolerating people with competing views is their worldview defense. However, it is also 
possible that mortality salience does not prime death-thoughts as effectively for liberals 
as for conservatives. Tolerance is a value espoused by humanists but not by normatives. 
Given this, it is possible to use polarity theory to determine whether holding a worldview 
affects the ability of mortality salience to prime death-thoughts, thus stopping worldview 
43 
 
defense, or whether a worldview that values tolerance is defended by increasing one‟s 
tolerance of people with views that oppose one‟s own. Greenberg and colleagues‟ (1992) 
finding that liberals actually rated essays with opposing views more positively after 
mortality salience (versus control) indicates that liberals are also affected by mortality 
salience. Thus it is predicted that 6) humanists and normatives will not differ on the 
number of death-thoughts elicited in mortality salience condition.  
It is possible that other variables could affect the relationship between mortality 
salience and worldview defense. Humanists and normatives could have different levels of 
American identity and that this could affect American worldview defense; therefore, 
American identity was measured. Previous use of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS) in TMT literature has indicated that the mortality salience induction does not 
negatively impact mood (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003). However, the PANAS was used as 
a way to measure possible affect evoked by the mortality salience induction and to 
control for the possible impact of mood on dependent measures. As reported above, 
people with naturally high levels of self-esteem and experimentally elevated levels of 
self-esteem show less defense in response to threats (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 
1992). Therefore, in order to assess for the possible impact of self-esteem, self-esteem 
was also measured. 
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Methods 
Participants and Design 
Please see Figure 2. Measurement Timeline on page 53 for an illustration of the 
measurement design.  
Participants consisted of 367 college students from the Psychology Department 
Subject Pool of a mid-sized Midwestern university. All participants were offered a choice 
between extra credit points or entry into a drawing for one of three 50 dollar Target gift 
cards in exchange for their participation. Exclusion criterion included expressing 
suspicion about the experimental manipulation or failure to complete the questionnaire. 
Thus, of those 367 participants, a total of 62 participants were excluded for the following 
reasons: 33 completed the second part of the survey more than 19 days after the first part 
of the survey; 1 completed the second part less than 9 days after completing part 1; 3 did 
not complete the experimental manipulation (mortality salience vs. dental pain 
induction); 4 completed both experimental conditions; 1 did not comply with instructions 
for the death-thoughts measure; 5 did not complete the worldview defense measure; 7 
answered worldview defense questions with an obvious pattern, such as all 5s; and 8 did 
not complete the personal ideology measure. Excluded participants did not differ from 
included ones on demographic variables. 
Demographics for the remaining 305 participants do not necessarily add up to 
100% because some participants did not answer certain demographic items.  Of 
participants included in analyses, 218 (71.5%) were women and 84 (27.5%) were men. 
Eight participants identified themselves as Latino or Central or South American (2.6%), 4 
45 
 
(1.3%) as African American, 14 (4.6%) as Asian/Asian American, 2 (.7%) as Arab/Arab 
American, 259 (84.9%) as Caucasian, and 18 (5.9%) as bi- or multi-racial. Almost half of 
the participants were freshman (n= 136), almost a quarter were sophomores (n= 73), 
almost a fifth were juniors (n= 60), 9.2 percent (n= 28) were seniors, and 1.0 percent 
were 5
th
 year seniors or graduate students. One hundred and seven participants (35.1%) 
identified themselves as politically conservative, 57 (18.7%) as centrist, and 135 (44.3%) 
as liberal. The majority of participants came from middle to high-income families, with 
60 (20.1%) with a yearly income above $150,000, 77 (25.2%) between $100,000 and 
$150,000, 54 (17.7%) between $75,000 and $99,999, 51 (16.7%) between $50,000 and 
$74,999, 14 (4.6%) between $40,000 and $49,999, 14 (4.6%) between $30,000 and 
$39,999, 13 (4.3%) between $20,000 and $29,999, 11 (3.6%) between $10,000 and 
$19,999, and 4 (1.3%) below $10,000. 
Subjects were assigned to a 2 (mortality salience vs. control) x 2 (death-thought 
word stems vs. neutral word stems) between subjects design by placing them in the 
groups according to their answers to questions in a way that should approximate random 
assignment.  Whether participants were placed in the death-thought word stems or neutral 
word stems groups was determined by their response to, “The third letter of my mother‟s 
maiden name is,” “A-M” or “N-Z”). This resulted in 51.6% of participants filling out 
death-related word stems and 48.4% of participants filling out control word stems. 
Whether participants were placed in the mortality salience condition or control condition 
was supposed to be determined by the question, “The third letter of my father‟s mother‟s 
first name begins with,” “A-M” or “N-Z.” However, the question was actually written, 
“My father‟s mother‟s first name begins with,” “A-M” or “N-Z.” This was resulting in 
46 
 
approximately 80% of participants being placed in the mortality salience condition. 
Therefore, we rotated which response placed the participants in the two groups 
approximately every 50 participants. This resulted in 189 participants (62.2%) in the 
dental pain condition and 115 participants (37.8%) in the mortality salience condition. 
Measures 
Gratitude questionnaire (GQ-6). The Gratitude Questionnaire (McCullough, 
Emmons, & Tsang, 2001, see Appendix) is a 6-item questionnaire that was used in order 
to create the appearance that we were measuring aspects of personality. It was originally 
developed to assess differences in how disposed individuals are to experience gratitude in 
daily life (McCullough et al., 2002). Participants rate items on a 7-point Likert scale (1= 
strongly disagree, to 7= strongly agree). This one-factor scale has been found to have 
acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach‟s α of .76), is related to peer ratings of gratitude, 
and is related to other, similar constructs such as life satisfaction and optimism 
(McCullough et al., 2002). In this study, Cronbach‟s α was .79. 
Modified polarity scale (MPS). Tomkins (1964) created the original Polarity 
Scale in order to measure individual differences in personal ideology. Tomkins‟ 
formulation provides us with a way to operationalize and to measure what we call 
“overall worldview.” The original measure was composed of 59 paired statements, with 
each pair composed of a statement representing a normative view and a statement 
representing a humanistic view. Participants were asked to check any statement with 
which they agreed. Thus a free choice format was used so that, in each pair, they could 
check one statement, both statements, or neither statement. The scale was scored by 
adding up the number of normative items endorsed to obtain a normativism scale score 
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and adding up the number of humanistic items endorsed to obtain a humanism scale 
score. Under advisement from Tomkins, Stone and Schaffner (1988) cut the number of 
pairs to 40 and revised and reworded many of the remaining items; however, the free 
choice response format was preserved as was the scoring method (see Appendix). Stone 
and Schaffner (1988) found both the humanism and normativism subscales of the MPS to 
have acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach‟s α of .78 for humanism and of .79 for 
normativism). Coppolillo (2006) similarly found acceptable internal reliability for each 
subscale, with a Cronbach‟s α of .75 for the humanism subscale and of .70 for the 
normativism scale. Acceptable internal reliabilities were also found in this study, with a 
Cronbach‟s α of .81 for the humanism subscale and of .78 for the normativism scale. 
In concordance with Tomkins‟ theory, Stone & Schaffner (1997) report that 
humanism and normativism were independent from one another in three separate 
samples. Criterion validity has been found for both the humanism and normativism 
subscales of the MPS (Walter & Stone, 1997 as cited in Stone & Schaffner, 1997). 
Humanism was positively related to positive affect (r = .15), openness (r = .34), 
agreeableness (r = .31), and empathy (r = .34) and negatively related to authoritarianism 
(r = -.35) and social dominance (r = -.39). Normativism was positively related to negative 
affect (r = .17), authoritarianism (r = .28) and social dominance (r = .37) and negatively 
related to positive affect (r = -.18), openness (r = -.34), and agreeableness (r = -.32; 
Walter & Stone, 1997 as cited in Stone & Schaffner, 1997, p values not reported). Using 
the same wording but a different scoring system, de St. Aubin (1996) also found criterion 
validity. In the area of “assumptions about human nature” de St. Aubin (1996, p.159) 
found that humanism was related to trustworthiness (r = .42, p< .001), altruism (r = .50, 
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p< .001), and complexity (r = .25, p< .05), and normativism was negatively related to 
altruism (r = -.25, p< .05). With respect to religion, humanism was positively related to 
humanistic metaphors about God (r = .38, p< .01) and negatively related to normative 
metaphors about God (r = -.38, p< .01) and God being perceived as an outside, rule based 
force (r = -.48, p<.001). Normativism was negatively related to God being “a human 
expression existing within humanity” (r = -.28, p< .05; de St. Aubin, 1996, p. 160). 
Within political orientation, humanism was positively correlated with liberalism (r = .41, 
p<.001) and negatively related to conservatism (r = -.30, p< .05), and normativism was 
negatively correlated with liberalism (r = -.30, p<.05; de St., Aubin, 1996). As would be 
expected, humanism scores were also positively related to values of Mature Love (r = -
.36, p< .01), Imagination (r = -.29, p< .05) and Broad Mindedness (r = -.39, p< .01) and 
low prioritization of Clean (r = .40, p< .001) and Politeness (r = .25, p<.05) on the 
Rokeach Values Scale. Normativism scores were negatively related to low prioritization 
of Politeness (r = -.25, p< .05) and positively related low prioritization of Imagination (r 
= .33, p< .01; de St. Aubin, 1996).   
Positive and negative affect scale (PANAS). The PANAS is a 20- item scale that 
measures both positive (e.g. enthusiastic, alert) and negative (e.g. distressed, anger) 
moods at the moment, today, over the past few days, over the past few weeks, over the 
past year, or in general (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988, see Appendix). The 
participants were asked how they felt “at the moment” for this study because shorter time 
periods measure immediate emotional responses, and longer time frames measure more 
stable differences in emotionality (Lucas, Diener, & Larsen, 2003). When participants 
were asked to respond about how they were feeling “in this moment” internal consistency 
49 
 
coefficients were .89 for positive affect (PA) and .85 for negative affect (NA) (Watson et 
al., 1988, p. 1065). In this study, internal consistency coefficients were .91 for PA and .86 
for NA. Convergent validity has been evidenced by associations with the Beck 
Depression Inventory, Hopkins Symptom Checklist, and State Anxiety Scale, with NA 
and PA subscales, respectively (Watson et al., 1988).  
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (RSE). The 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(see Appendix) was used to measure participants‟ attitudes towards themselves 
(Cronbach‟s α = .82). The RSE has advantages over other self-esteem scales in that it is 
easy to administer and takes little time to complete (Rosenberg, 1965). In addition, 
Rosenberg (1965) claims that the scale is unidimensional and, thus, easy to interpret. 
Although some subsequent researchers have found two factors within the RSE, “positive 
self-esteem” and “negative self-esteem,” these two factors seem to come from the same 
theoretical dimension of self-esteem (Carmines & Zeller, 1974). Other research has 
supported the unidimensional structure of the RSE and indicates that the RSE measures 
“experienced self-esteem” (Demo, 1985, p.1500). The RSE uses a 4-point Likert scale (0 
= Strongly Disagree to 3 = Strongly Agree), and includes items such as “I feel that I have 
a number of good qualities” and “I feel I do not have much to be proud of.” Items that are 
worded negatively are reverse scored so that, when added to the scores of the positively 
worded items, higher scores indicate higher experienced self-esteem. The scale has high 
internal reliability, Cronbach‟s α = .92 (Rosenberg, 1965) and .90 in this study, and has 
been found to have good construct and face validity (Demo, 1985; Rosenberg, 1965).  
Death-thought accessibility (DTA). Death though accessibility was measured by 
having participants fill in two missing letters from 25 word fragments (see Appendix). Of 
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the 25 words, six can be completed as either neutral or death-related words. For example, 
the word fragment SK_ _ L could be completed as the neutral word skill or as the death-
related word skull. Possible death-related words include buried, dead, grave, killed, skull, 
and coffin. Although not reportedly used in previous literature, words such as “noose” 
and “widow” misspelled as “widdow” were also counted (this only occurred in the death 
word stem condition, not in the neutral word stem condition). Many studies have found 
an increase in death-thoughts after mortality salience induction using the DTA (e.g., 
Greenberg et al., 1994, Greenberg et al., 2000, Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 
1997, & Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997). Despite the widespread use of this 
measure, to our knowledge, no reliability data have been reported. Possible reasons for 
the lack of reliability data include that the item responses are words rather than numbers 
and that it is not expected that people who receive the mortality salience condition would 
think of all six possible death words. 
Worldview defense. We measured worldview defense with 5 evaluative 
questions (see Appendix), as in Greenberg and colleagues (1994, 2003). Participants 
responded to these 5 questions about each of the 6 essays (pro-American, anti-American, 
pro-Humanism, anti-Humanism, pro-Normativism, anti-Normativism). The pro- and anti- 
American essays were used with permission of Greenberg (personal communication 
February 25, 2009). The pro- and anti- Humanism and Normativism essays were 
developed for this study based on items from the Modified Polarity Scale and 
styled/formatted like the pro- and anti- American essays. Four experts on polarity theory 
were asked to categorize the four essays and were asked for suggestions to improve the 
essays. Three reviewers had 100% agreement with our categorization. The final reviewer 
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flipped the categorization of two of the essays, thus, having 50% agreement with our 
categorization. Of the 5 evaluative questions, 3 questions assessed the participants‟ 
assessment of the author (likeability, intelligence, and knowledge of the author) and two 
questions evaluating participants‟ opinions about the essay itself (how much participants 
agreed with the essay and how true the opinions expressed in the essay are). Questions 
were rated on a scale of 1 (negative rating) to 9 (positive rating). Greenberg et al. (1994) 
constructed two separate composite measures by 1) “subtracting the mean of the three 
anti-U.S. author items from the mean of the three pro-U.S. author items” and 2) 
“subtracting the mean of the two anti-U.S. essay items from the mean of the two pro-U.S. 
essay items” (p. 629). Greenberg et al. (1994) used only the composite made up of the 
two items referring to the author to measure worldview defense and did not report 
reliability or validity of the measure. Greenberg et al. (2003) used the entire 5-item 
questionnaire to evaluate worldview defense. They reported adequate internal reliability 
for the 5-item measure for both the pro-U.S. essay (Cronbach‟s α = .87) and the anti-U.S. 
essay (Cronbach‟s α = .89). In the current study, internal reliability for each of the 6 
essays was excellent (pro-U.S. essay, α = .92; anti-U.S. essay, α = .93; pro-normativism 
essay, α = .92; pro-humanism essay, α = .94; anti-humanism, α = .91; anti-normativism, α 
= .94).  
In order to determine the most appropriate way of using the measure to evaluate 
worldview defense, factor analyses of each of the six 5-item measures were conducted 
using principal components analysis (PCA). Before performing PCA, the data were 
inspected using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values, which all exceeded the recommended .3, 
and Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity, which all reached statistical significance, indicating the 
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factorability of the data. For each of the six measures, PCA revealed the presence of one 
factor with an eigenvalue exceeding 1, explaining 77.00%, 78.81%, 77.95%, 81.28%, 
72.93%, and 79.61% of variance in the pro-American, anti-American, pro-normativism, 
pro-humanism, anti-humanism, and anti-normativism measures, respectively. 
Investigation of the scree plots indicated a clear bend at the second component for each 
of the six factor analyses. Using Cattell‟s (1966) scree test, it was decided that the each 
measure contains one factor. Thus, for each of the three categories of essay, the entire 
composite measure was used to measure worldview defense as in Greenberg and 
colleagues (2003).  
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Procedure 
Figure 2. Measurement Timeline 
 
2 week break 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               2 week break 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MPS= Modified Polarity Scale (Humanism/Normativism), RSE= Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, 
PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, Worldview Defense = reading each of the 6 essays and 
answering questions about the author and opinions expressed in each essay. Random assignment was made 
for whether participants received the MPS before or after the rest of the questionnaires, whether 
participants received Mortality Salience or Dental Pain questions, and whether participants filled out the 
Death-thought or Control word Association task. 
MPS and American 
identity (here or at end) 
n= 174 
Gratitude Questionnaire           
N = 304 
N 
NN 
 
Mortality Salience           
n = 115 
Dental Pain                       
n = 189 
RSE/PANAS 
(counterbalanced) 
RSE/PANAS 
(counterbalanced) 
Death-thought 
Association         
n = 57 
Control Word 
Association         
n = 58 
Death-thought 
Association         
n = 89 
Control Word 
Association         
n = 100 
Worldview 
Defense             
(6 essays 
counterbalanced
)  
MPS and American identity 
(here or at the beginning)          
n = 130 
Worldview 
Defense               
(6 essays 
counterbalanced)  
Worldview 
Defense             
(6 essays 
counterbalanced
)  
Worldview 
Defense             
(6 essays 
counterbalanced
)  
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Modified polarity scale (MPS). Greenberg and colleagues (1990) showed that 
priming of values that are part of one‟s worldview can affect worldview defense. In the 
current study, measuring participants‟ levels of humanism and normativism two weeks 
prior to or two weeks after the rest of the experiment allowed us to check to make sure 
that there was no unintended priming of participants‟ worldviews. We used 
counterbalancing to prevent possible order effects. If participants filled out the MPS two 
weeks before the remainder of the experiment, they were asked to read and sign a consent 
form prior to completing the MPS. 
Questionnaires including experimental manipulation. Please see Figure 2 for 
an illustration of when participants were asked to fill out the different measures and at 
what point random assignment occurred. Participants visited a secure website, read and 
electronically signed the consent form if they had not already done so, and then 
completed the study online. Similar to other TMT research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003) 
the study was explained as an investigation of how personality traits influence social 
judgment.  The participants then filled out a filler personality questionnaire. The next 
page manipulated mortality salience. Those in the mortality salience condition answered 
two items: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death 
arouses in you” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to 
you physically as you die and once you are physically dead” (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003, 
p. 517). Those in the control condition answered the same questions but regarding dental 
pain. Next, participants filled out the self-esteem measure (RSE) and mood rating form 
(PANAS). Then participants filled out either the death-thoughts accessibility (DTA) 
measure or a neutral word completion task (to determine whether certain 
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humanism/normativism profiles influence priming of non-conscious death-thoughts). As 
reviewed above, Arndt and colleagues‟ (1997) found that removal of death-thoughts from 
awareness is necessary for worldview defense. Given this, both the DTA and the neutral 
word completion task were necessary to ensure that writing the death words would not 
bring the death-thoughts back into consciousness enough to prevent worldview defense. 
Finally, the participants completed the social judgment task (worldview defense 
measure), which consisted of reading six short essays including pro- and anti- American, 
pro- and anti-humanism, and pro- and anti- normativism essays (counterbalanced for 
order) and rating the author of, and opinion expressed in, each of those essays (thus, 
measuring worldview defense). We retained the same format for the pro- and anti- 
humanism and pro- and anti- normativism essays as the pro- and anti-American essays in 
Greenberg and colleagues‟ (1992, 1994) research.  
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Results 
Analyses 
 Predictor variables included the humanism and normativism scores and the mortality 
salience versus dental pain variable (rated 1 for mortality salience and 0 for dental pain). 
Our hypotheses centered on the possibility that different categories of people would show 
different susceptibility to mortality salience.  Therefore, the first step of our data analysis 
involved categorizing our participants according to their levels of humanism and 
normativism. Participants that scored in the highest and lowest quartiles of humanism and 
normativism were labeled as high and low humanists and high and low normatives (with 
participants in the middle quartiles remaining unlabeled). After categorization of 
participants, ANOVAs and t-tests, explained in more detail below, were utilized to test 
hypotheses 1 through 6. Refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for All Measures by Condition: Mortality Salience, 
Dental Pain, and Overall 
 
Measures    Mean (SD) 
   Overall 
Mean (SD) 
Mortality Salience 
  Mean (SD) 
  Dental Pain 
Humanism     29.20 (5.80)     29.21 (5.69)     29.20 (5.87) 
Normativism     12.74 (5.57)     12.55 (5.49)     12.86 (5.62) 
American identity 6.28 (1.95) 6.36 (1.99) 6.22 (1.94) 
RSE     31.62 (5.18)     31.93 (5.32)     31.43 (5.10)  
PANAS Positive     29.52 (8.48)     30.16 (8.48)     29.13 (8.48) 
PANAS Negative     17.80 (6.62)     18.32 (7.05)     17.49 (6.35) 
DTA* 1.78 (1.03)            1.93 (0.92) 1.70 (1.09) 
American Defense 1.85 (2.53) 2.02 (2.49) 1.74 (2.55) 
Normativism Defense -0.78 (2.13) -0.60 (2.25) -0.88 (2.05) 
Humanism Defense 3.13 (2.24) 3.28 (2.26) 3.03 (2.23) 
Notes. RSE= Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, PANAS= Positive and Negative Affect Scale, and DTA= 
Death Thought Association questionnaire * Only participants who completed this measure were included, 
thus, Overall n= 157. 
 
Table 2 
Intercorrelations Among Demographic and Outcome Variables   ____________ _______                          
                           1_ ___  2 _  __  3___ _  4_ _      5 ___      6   __       7      8   
1.   RSE               -  .32**    -.35**    .15**    .31**     .07           .20**     -.06 
2.   PANAS Positive     -            .04       .10      .07        .04           .04         -.03 
3. PANAS Negative                -    -.10     -.24**     .05          -.24**     .23**    
4. American Identity                      .12*     -.06           .34**  -.07 
5. Humanism Defense            -       - .25**      .39**    .09 
6. Normativism Defense                          -           -.04    .05 
7. American Defense        -   -.01 
8. DTA               - 
Notes. RSE= Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, PANAS= Positive and Negative Affect Scale, DTA= Death 
Thought Association questionnaire, * p < .05, ** p < .01, n = 298 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, self-esteem, negative mood (PANAS negative), and 
American identity, were related to outcome measures. Therefore, regression analyses 
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were performed to determine whether self-esteem, negative mood, or American identity 
impacted the relationship between mortality salience and elicitation of death-thoughts, or 
between mortality salience and worldview defense. The two predictor variables (e.g., 
American identity and mortality salience versus dental pain) were entered into the first 
step of the regression equations in order to test for main effects, and the interaction term 
was entered into the second step of the regression equations.   
There was a main effect for self-esteem predicting American defense (β = .18, p= 
.01), and a main effect for self-esteem predicting humanism defense (β = .35, p< .01). 
However, the interactions between mortality salience and self-esteem predicting 
American defense (β = .03, p> .05) and humanism defense (β = -.08, p> .05) were non-
significant. Nor was there a three-way interaction between mortality salience, self-
esteem, and high or low humanism predicting humanism defense (β = -.15, p> .05). 
Similarly, there were main effects for American identity predicting American 
defense (β = .35, p< .01) and humanism defense (β = .16, p< .05). However, American 
identity did not moderate the relationship between mortality salience and American 
defense (β = -.09, p> .05). The three-way interaction among American identity, mortality 
salience, and humanism predicting humanism defense was also non-significant (β = -.31, 
p> .05). 
Negative mood did not predict humanism defense (β = -.08, p> .05), nor did the 
two-way interaction between negative mood and mortality salience (β = -.32, p> .05) or 
the three-way interaction between negative mood, mortality salience, and high or low 
humanism (β = .22, p> .05). Negative mood did predict American defense (β = -.26, p< 
.01), but the interaction between mortality salience and negative mood did not predict 
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American defense (β = .03, p> .05). Similarly, negative mood predicted the number of 
death words reported (β = .34, p< .01), but the interaction between negative mood and 
mortality salience did not predict number of death words. 
Taken together, the regression analyses suggest that the variables of self-esteem, 
negative mood, and American identity did not impact the relationship between mortality 
salience and elicitation of death-thoughts, or between mortality salience and worldview 
defense. 
Manipulation Check 
 In order to determine whether the mortality salience manipulation worked, t-tests 
were conducted comparing the mortality salience and dental pain conditions on the 
number of death words elicited, and on each of the worldview defense measures. As can 
be seen in Table 3, no significant differences were found, suggesting that the 
manipulation did not work. However, one should not necessarily be surprised that no 
differences were found in the overall sample of participants, when humanists, non-
humanists, normatives, and non-normatives are aggregated. Indeed hypotheses 1-4 posit 
that mortality salience will have different effects depending on the type and strength of 
worldview that is held.  The aggregate picture lacks the resolution to reveal these 
interactive effects. Nonetheless, the aggregate findings are presented below. 
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Table 3   
Outcome Measures for Participants in Mortality Salience or Dental Pain Conditions 
 
 
Measures 
Mortality Salience 
 
   M             SD           
   Dental Pain 
 
 M          SD          
   
 
df              t 
 
 
t 
DTA*    1.93        0.92 1.70      1.09   136.61 -1.53 
American Defense    2.02        2.49 1.74      2.55   304 -0.98 
Normativism 
Defense 
  -0.60        2.25 -0.88     2.05   303 -1.18 
Humanism Defense    3.28        2.26 3.03      2.23   304 -0.94 
Note. *For DTA (Death-thought Association) homogeneity of variance was violated (p = .012); therefore, 
the t and df values for “do not assume equal variances” are reported. 
 
 
In Figure 3, it can be seen that there was no difference between the mortality salience and 
dental pain groups for number of death words given in the DTA. 
 
Figure 3.  Death Words Completed in the Mortality Salience and Dental Pain Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The figure depicts the mean (SEM) death words completed by the two 
experimental groups. 
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In Figure 4, it can be seen that there was no difference between the mortality salience or 
dental pain groups for how strongly participants defended the American worldview. In 
Figure 5, it can be seen that there was no difference between the mortality salience or 
dental pain groups for how strongly participants defended the humanist worldview. 
 
Figure 4.  Defense of the American Worldview in the Mortality Salience and Dental Pain 
Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The figure depicts the mean (SEM) American Defense score for the two 
experimental groups. 
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Figure 5. Humanism Defense by Participants in Mortality Salience and Dental Pain 
Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) Humanism Defense score for the two 
experimental groups. 
 
Similarly, in Figure 6, it can be seen that there was no difference in how strongly 
participants defended the normative worldview in the mortality salience or dental pain 
groups. The scale for each of the worldview defense measures goes from -9 to +9. Thus, 
when a negative value is shown, such as for normativism defense, it indicates that 
participants rated the anti-normativism essay more positively than the pro-normativism 
essay. 
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Figure 6. Normativism Defense by Participants in Mortality Salience and Dental Pain 
Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) Normativism Defense score for the two 
experimental groups. 
 
In order to test whether completing the death thought accessibility measure would 
affect worldview defense, for the conditions of death-thought accessibility, the group 
given death word stems was rated 1, and the group given neutral word stems was rated 0. 
Then, this dichotomous variable was used as a predictor in a 2 (mortality salience vs. 
dental pain) x 2 (death word stems vs. neutral stems) ANOVA with the three worldview 
defense scores as criterion variables. As can be seen in Figure 7, there were no main 
effects, nor was there an interaction effect, indicating that completing the death thought 
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accessibility measure did not affect defense of the American worldview in either the 
mortality salience or the control condition. 
Figure 7. Effects of Mortality Salience and Word Stem Type on American Defense 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) American Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and control word stems, dental pain and death thought word stems, 
mortality salience and control word stems, and mortality salience and death thought word 
stems. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8, there were no main effects, nor was there an interaction 
effect, indicating that completing the death thought accessibility measure did not affect 
defense of the normative worldview in either experimental condition. 
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Figure 8.  Effects of Mortality Salience and Word Stem Type on Normativism Defense 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) Normativism Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and control word stems, dental pain and death thought word stems, 
mortality salience and control word stems, and mortality salience and death thought word 
stems. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 9, there were no main effects, nor was there an interaction 
effect, indicating that completing the death thought accessibility measure did not affect 
defense of the humanist worldview in either the mortality salience or the control 
condition. 
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Figure 9. Effects of Mortality Salience and Word Stem Type on Humanism Defense 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) Humanism Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and control word stems, dental pain and death thought word stems, 
mortality salience and control word stems, and mortality salience and death thought word 
stems. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 In order to test the hypothesis that mortality salience would increase the defense 
of the humanist worldview for humanists, a 2 (high humanism vs. low humanism) x 2 
(mortality salience vs. dental pain) ANOVA was performed (please see Figure 10). There 
was a main effect for humanism (F (1, 176)= 22.27, p<.001, ɳp
2
= .11) such that 
participants who scored high in humanism (humanists) defended humanism more than 
participants who scored low in humanism (non-humanists) regardless of whether they 
were exposed to mortality salience or dental pain. There was no main effect of mortality 
salience on humanism defense (F(1, 176) = .87, p> .05). However, there was an 
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interaction effect (F(1, 176) = 4.41, p< .05, ɳp
2= .02). Fisher‟s PLSD post hoc tests were 
conducted. Results indicated that the interaction between humanism and experimental 
condition was such that humanists defended humanism more in the mortality salience 
condition than in the dental pain condition (t(85)= -2.33, p< .05), but non-humanists did 
not defend humanism differently based on experimental condition (t(91)= .78, p> .05). 
Thus, hypothesis 1 was fully supported. 
Figure 10. Effect of Mortality Salience on Humanism Defense, as a Function of Humanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) Humanism Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and low humanism, dental pain and high humanism, mortality 
salience and low humanism, and mortality salience and high humanism. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 In order to test the hypothesis that mortality salience would increase the defense 
of the normative worldview for normatives, a 2 (high normativism vs. low normativism) 
x 2 (mortality salience vs. dental pain) ANOVA was performed (please see Figure 11). 
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There was a main effect for normativism (F(1, 162) = 15.72, p<.001, ɳp
2
= .09) such that 
participants who scored high in normativism (normatives) defended normativism more, 
or were less negative towards a normative worldview, than participants who scored low 
in normativism (non-normatives). There was no main effect of mortality salience (F(1, 
162)= .49, p> .05), nor was there an interaction effect (F(1, 162) = .36, p> .05). Thus, 
hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Figure 11. Effect of Mortality Salience on Normativism Defense, as a Function of 
Normativism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) Normativism Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and low normativism, dental pain and high normativism, mortality 
salience and low normativism, and mortality salience and high normativism. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 In order to test whether humanists would demonstrate a weaker mortality salience 
effect than would normatives (that is, the effect of mortality salience on normative 
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defense by normatives would exceed the effect of mortality salience on humanist defense 
by humanists), a 2 (mortality salience vs. dental pain) x 2 (high versus low humanism) x 
2 (high versus low normativism) x 2 (ideology defense-normativism defense versus 
humanism defense), mixed measure ANOVA was performed. Hypothesis 3 would be 
supported by a significant 4-way interaction among these factors. As expected given the 
results of hypothesis 1 and 2, there were two-way interactions between humanism and 
ideology defense (F(1, 92) = 13.33, p<.001, ɳp
2
= .13) and between normativism and 
ideology defense (F(1, 92) = 4.81, p<.05, ɳp
2
= .05). These interactions were such that 
humanists defended humanism more than non-humanists and non-humanists defended 
normativism more than humanists (see Figure 12).   
Similarly, normatives defended normativism more than non-normatives and non-
normatives defended humanism more than normatives (see Figure 12). There was no 
two-way interaction between experimental group and the repeated measure of ideology 
defense (F(1, 92)= 1.55, p = .22). There was no three-way interaction among ideology 
defense, mortality salience, and humanism (F(1, 92)= 2.44, p = .12). Nor was there a 
three-way interaction among ideology defense, mortality salience, and normativism (F(1, 
92)= 0.97, p = .33). Finally, contrary to our expectations, there was no four-way 
interaction among ideology defense, experimental group, normativism, and humanism 
(F(1, 92)= 2.46, p = .12); thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported.  
70 
 
Figure 12. Relative Effect of Mortality Salience in Humanists and Normatives as 
Indicated by Defense of Their Respective Worldviews 
 
Figure 12. The figure depicts the mean Humanism Defense and Normativism Defense 
scores for the eight groups: dental pain and low humanism, dental pain and high 
humanism, mortality salience and low humanism, mortality salience and high humanism, 
dental pain and low normativism, dental pain and high normativism, mortality salience 
and low normativism, mortality salience and high normativism. 
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Hypothesis 4 
 In order to test the hypothesis that mortality salience would lead to defense of the 
American worldview for normatives (there would be a larger difference between the pro- 
American and anti- American essays in the mortality salience condition than in the dental 
pain condition), a 2 (high normativism vs. low normativism) x 2 (mortality salience vs. 
dental pain) ANOVA was performed (please see Figure 13). No main effects were found 
for normativism (F (1, 162) = .25, p>.05) or for experimental condition (F(1, 162) = .04, 
p> .05), nor was there an interaction effect (F(1, 162) = 1.03, p> .05). Thus, hypothesis 4 
was not supported. 
Figure 13. Effect of Mortality Salience on American Defense, as a Function of 
Normativism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) American Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and low normativism, dental pain and high normativism, mortality 
salience and low normativism and mortality salience and high normativism. 
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Hypothesis 5 
In order to test the hypothesis that mortality salience would not lead to defense of 
the American worldview for humanists (for humanists, the mean American defense score 
would not be higher in the mortality salience condition than in the control condition), a 2 
(high humanism vs. low humanism) x 2 (mortality salience vs. dental pain) ANOVA was 
performed (please see Figure 14). No main effects were found for humanism (F (1, 175)= 
.81, p>.05) or for experimental condition (F(1, 175) = .003, p> .05), nor was there an 
interaction effect (F(1, 175) = .001, p> .05). Although the result is consistent with 
hypothesis 5, its impact is necessarily limited in light of a lack of support for hypothesis 
4, as normatives did not defend the American worldview more in the mortality salience 
condition. 
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Figure 14. Effect of Mortality Salience on American Defense, as a Function of 
Humanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) American Defense score for the four 
groups: dental pain and low humanism, dental pain and high humanism, mortality 
salience and low humanism, and mortality salience and high humanism. 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 
 In order to test the hypothesis that humanists and normatives would not differ on 
the number of death words elicited in the mortality salience condition, a 2 (high 
normativism vs. high humanism) x 2 (mortality salience vs. dental pain) ANOVA was 
performed (please see Figure 15). No main effects were found for ideology (F (1, 82)= 
1.08, p>.05) or for experimental condition (F(1, 82) = .06, p> .05). Nor was there an 
interaction effect (F(1, 82) = .87, p> .05), thus, supporting our hypothesis that humanists 
and normatives would not differ on the number of accessible death-thoughts. 
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Figure 15. Effect of Mortality Salience on Number of Death Words, as a Function of 
High Ideology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The figure depicts the mean (SEM) number of death words elicited for the 
four groups: dental pain and high humanism, dental pain and high normativism, mortality 
salience and high humanism, and mortality salience and high normativism. 
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Discussion 
Summary of Results 
 This dissertation investigated the generalizability of Terror Management Theory 
(TMT) and the mechanisms by which individual difference variables work in the TMT 
process. More specifically, the project investigated 1) Whether one‟s personal worldview 
moderates the impact of mortality salience on traditional, cultural worldview defense, 2) 
whether one‟s personal worldview determines the strength of defense of that personal 
worldview, and 3) whether personal worldview moderates between proximal defenses 
and death-thoughts.  
 The manipulation check indicated that there were no differences between the 
mortality salience and dental pain conditions on the number of death words or on 
worldview defense measures, suggesting that the manipulation did not work. This is not 
necessarily surprising, given that the analyses were performed on an aggregate of all of 
the participants, including humanists (participants in the top quartile on the humanism 
scale), non-humanists (participants in the bottom quartile on the humanism scale), 
normatives (those in the top quartile on the normativism scale), and non-normatives 
(those in the bottom quartile on the normativism scale). Multiple hypotheses predicted 
that mortality salience effects would depend on the type and strength of worldview held, 
which would not necessarily be seen in an aggregate picture.   
Humanists defended humanism more than non-humanists, regardless of 
experimental condition. Additionally, the hypothesized interaction effect between 
humanism and mortality salience was present, such that humanists defended humanism 
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more in the mortality salience condition than in the dental pain condition. In contrast, 
non-humanists did not defend humanism differently based on experimental condition. 
Although normatives defended normativism more, in general, than did non-normatives, 
mortality salience did not increase the defense of the normative worldview for 
normatives. Contrary to expectations, humanists and normatives did not differ in their 
defense of their respective worldviews (i.e., the effect for normativism defense by 
normatives versus non-normatives in the mortality salience condition was not different 
from the effect for humanism defense by humanists versus non-humanists in the mortality 
salience condition, see Figure 12, p. 70).  
Among normatives, mortality salience had no impact on the differential rating of 
the pro- and anti-American essays. Similarly, mortality salience did not lead to defense of 
the American worldview for humanists (for humanists, the mean American defense score 
was not higher in the mortality salience condition than in the non-mortality salience 
condition). Although this supports the prediction that mortality salience would not lead to 
defense of the American worldview for humanists, it does not fit with our prediction that 
the strength of the mortality salience effect would be different for humanists and 
normatives. Humanists and normatives did not differ on accessible death-thoughts, 
regardless of experimental treatment. 
Interpretation of Results 
Manipulation check. As stated above, the manipulation did not appear to work; 
there were no differences between the mortality salience and dental pain conditions on 
the number of death words or on worldview defense measures. Again, this is not 
necessarily surprising, given that the analyses were performed on all participants, 
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regardless of worldview. Multiple hypotheses stated that holding different worldviews 
would moderate the effect that mortality salience has on worldview defense, which would 
not necessarily be seen in analyses that included all participants.  
 However, it is also possible that the manipulation did not work. The Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem scale was used as one of our filler measures. Many studies have found that 
self-esteem buffers existential anxiety and, thus, decreases the need for worldview 
defense (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). It is possible that 
simply answering the items on the self-esteem scale made participants cognizant of their 
self-esteem and decreased their need to defend their worldviews. If that were the case, 
one would expect participants with higher self-esteems to have defended their 
worldviews less than participants with lower self-esteem after mortality salience. 
However; no interaction between mortality salience and self-esteem was found. Nor was 
there any relationship between self-esteem and number of death-thoughts available after 
the filler measures. Additionally, there have been studies that refute the importance of 
explicit self-esteem (e.g., Baldwin & Wesley, 1996) and show the importance of implicit 
self-esteem (Schmeichel et al., 2009), which was not measured or manipulated in this 
study. The results of our analyses taken together with the current literature suggest that 
the measurement of self-esteem was not the cause of the lack of overall mortality salience 
effects. 
Hypothesis 1. As was predicted, mortality salience increased the defense of the 
humanist worldview for humanists. This is congruent with TMT and past, culture 
specific, TMT research. Thus, findings indicate that TMT may be generalizeable to 
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defense of overall worldviews in addition to defense of more specific, cultural 
worldviews.  
Hypothesis 2. Surprisingly, mortality salience did not increase the defense of the 
normative worldview for normatives. Although normatives did defend normativism more 
than non-normatives, the defense was not dependent on experimental condition. There 
are a number of potential reasons for the failure of normatives to demonstrate the typical 
mortality salience effect.  
First, there may have been a social desirability bias. The wording of the anti-
normativism essay is more congruent with messages taught in American institutions of 
higher learning, than is the wording of the pro-normativism essay. For example, “I have a 
lot of trouble with people who believe that there is one “truth” and one “right way” of 
being and that people don‟t deserve love and respect unless they are living out the norms 
and rules that put them on that „right path‟” may fit more with our American, collegiate 
culture than “Although it would be nice to think that people are all good at heart, the truth 
is that most people only have their own best interests in mind. In fact, if people were 
actually honest with each other, I think we would find much more hostility and hatred in 
the world.”  While the pro- and anti- normativism essays did accurately represent the 
views of someone who would be for and against a normative worldview, perhaps a 
different pro-normative essay could have expressed the ideals of a normative person in a 
more nuanced way, without seeming to go against the messages sent in an institution of 
higher learning. 
 Another potential reason that mortality salience did not induce defense of the 
normative worldview could be that normatives do not respond to the mortality salience 
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induction in the same way that humanists do. In other words, the possibility remains that 
mortality salience does not provoke worldview defense for normatives. This would run 
counter to all of the other TMT literature.  
Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis that humanists would defend the humanist 
worldview less strongly than normatives would defend the normative worldview (in other 
words, that there would be a stronger effect of mortality salience on respective worldview 
defense by normatives, than by humanists) was not supported. This hypothesis was an 
extension of previous literature, but has not been explicitly suggested by that literature. 
Past research has suggested that securely attached individuals do not engage in 
worldview defense (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000), nor do those who value tolerance 
(Greenberg et al., 1992).  Trust and tolerance are not, in themselves, worldviews; 
however, people who have a humanistic worldview are more trusting of others and see 
the good in all human beings (de St. Aubin, 1996). Thus, it would be predicted that 
humanism would be related to secure attachment style and to tolerance.  
The majority of past research had left unclear whether securely attached 
individuals did not defend cultural worldviews because their secure attachment protected 
them from existential anxiety, or because they defended themselves from this anxiety in 
another way. However, one specific study suggested that securely attached individuals 
seek interpersonal closeness as a way to buffer their anxiety (Mikulincer, Florian, & 
Hirschberger, 2004). This research has now been incorporated into the anxiety buffer 
hypothesis of TMT, such that worldview, self-esteem, and relationships are all 
components of the anxiety buffer that protects humans from existential terror (e.g., 
Pyszczynski & Kesebir, 2011). Similar research determining whether those who value 
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tolerance are less affected by mortality salience or whether they defend their worldviews 
differently has yet to be performed. By investigating what would happen if those views of 
trust and tolerance were the ones challenged after mortality salience, this study began to 
parse out those potential effects. TMT would assert that a direct challenge to one‟s 
worldview after mortality salience (for instance, the anti-normative essay challenges a 
normative worldview) would result in worldview defense. However, we had 
hypothesized that humanists would be less affected than normatives by mortality 
salience. It seems that, in line with TMT and the more recent TMT studies with 
attachment, humanists and normatives defend their worldviews to equal extents following 
mortality salience. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5. The hypothesis that mortality salience would lead to defense 
of the American worldview for normatives (mortality salience would have an impact on 
the differential rating of the pro- and anti- American essays for normatives but not for 
humanists) was not supported. The hypothesis that mortality salience would not lead to 
defense of the American worldview for humanists was statistically supported. However, 
hypotheses 4 and 5 were meant to show a contrast between how humanists and 
normatives would defend the American worldview after mortality salience. Given that 
neither normatives nor humanists defended the American worldview more in the 
mortality salience condition, neither hypothesis was supported. 
It is possible that humanists and normatives have different levels of American 
identity and that this could affect American worldview defense. Therefore, further 
analyses were conducted to see whether American identity was related to American 
defense and whether American identity was related to humanism and normativism. If 
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American identity were more strongly related to normativism than to humanism, 
normatives would be expected to defend the American worldview more strongly than 
would humanists after mortality salience. However, the analyses indicated that neither 
normativism nor humanism was related to American identity or to American defense. 
American identity was related to American defense, although there was no interaction 
between American identity and mortality salience. The question remains as to why 
mortality salience did not increase American defense among those with strong American 
identity. Though not directly related to our hypotheses, this finding goes against existing 
TMT literature (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). 
Hypothesis 6. The hypothesis that humanists and normatives would not differ on 
the number of death words elicited in the mortality salience condition was supported. The 
non-difference in number of death words could have occurred if the mortality salience 
effect did not work. The mortality salience effect did work for humanists in that they 
defended their worldview more in the mortality salience condition; however, mortality 
salience did not increase the number of death words for humanists or normatives. Thus it 
is difficult to say whether the manipulation worked. Let us assume that the manipulation 
did work. Humanists and normatives did not differ on the number of death words elicited, 
so it is likely that mortality salience primes death-thoughts equally for humanists and 
normatives.  This suggests that differences found in defense of worldviews by humanists 
and normatives occur in processes that follow death-thought evocation (see p. 3, Figure 1 
for the steps in the TMT model of defense against existential anxiety). 
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Limitations 
In addition to the potential problems discussed above, methodological limitations 
remain. It is troublesome that the anti-American essay used in Greenberg and colleagues‟ 
(1992, 1994) research includes incorrect grammar and a poor command of the English 
language (e.g., “The system here is set up for rich against the poor…This no sympathy 
for people…Its all one group putting down others…America is a cold country that is 
unsensitive...”). On the other hand, there are no spelling or grammatical errors in the pro-
America essay (see Appendix). The poor English may influence ratings of „”how 
intelligent do you think this person was” and “how knowledgeable do you think this 
person was,” and thus prevent a direct measure of worldview defense. The inclusion of 
improper grammar may have produced a confound between the defense of worldview and 
the defense of like-intelligence. Or, it may measure worldview defense, but only if 
intelligence is a valued part of that worldview. The format of the pro- and anti- American 
essays is also problematic in that it explicitly sets up opposition between in-group and 
out-group members rather than sticking to differences in worldview. While recognizing 
these potential problems, the same problems are potential contaminants of any of the 
TMT literature that uses these essays.  The standard essays and formatting of new essays 
were retained for the purposes of direct comparison with the existing TMT literature. 
Also, our participants completed the questionnaires on-line and, thus, could have 
done so anywhere with the necessary computer and internet access. The results of the 
study could have been influenced by the environment in which the surveys were 
completed.  Dormitory environments may have buffered the mortality salience effect. 
Alternatively, the potential variance in environments might have introduced variance into 
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the results and reduced the power of the analyses to reveal mortality salience effects. The 
participants may have had roommates or friends in the room, and they may have been 
filling out the questionnaires as quickly as possible to obtain their extra credit. Had they 
filled out the questionnaires in the room with a researcher present, the participants may 
have been reminded that they were completing the study not only for extra credit, but also 
to help someone complete important research. Other than the participants who were 
excluded for clearly not putting an effort into completing the questionnaires (e.g., filling 
out all 5‟s for a measure), we do not have data indicating that participants paid attention 
differently or took the tasks less seriously than if they had been in a laboratory setting 
(the majority of TMT research has been in a laboratory).  
The study started with 305 participants. However, in order to address our 
hypotheses, this group was both quartiled and assigned to 4 different conditions. Thus, 
there were significantly fewer participants in the conditions being compared in the 
analyses than was originally expected. This resulted in many of the analyses having poor 
power. The least powerful tests were those that included dental pain versus mortality 
salience, an important test for our hypotheses, which ranged from β = .05-.30. The 
highest power for tests of possible interaction effects was β = .68. According to 
G*Power, with a medium effect size (ɳ2 = .25) and 4 groups, a sample size of 180 should 
have been sufficient to obtain a power of .80. However, with a small effect size (ɳ2 = .10) 
and 6 groups, a sample size of 1,096 would be required to obtain a power of .80.  Thus, it 
is possible that more significant effects would have been found with a higher N or with a 
more equal number of participants in each of the groups. Effect sizes in TMT literature 
range from r = -.48-.99, but are generally small to medium (M= .36, SD= .19) even with 
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smaller overall sample sizes (range of N= 17-343, M= 87.3, SD= 50.8; Burke, Martens, 
& Faucher, 2010). The effect and sample sizes of previous studies combined with the 
observation that our effect sizes were so low in the non-significant tests, make it is 
unlikely that simply increasing the number of participants would have made those tests 
significant.  
Our sample was limited to mainly female (71.5%), Caucasian (84.9%) college 
students from high-income families (63% above $75,000/year).  College students may 
react differently to mortality salience than older participants. Indeed, Maxfield and 
colleagues (2007) found that older adults (age 61-84) did not judge moral transgressions 
more harshly after mortality salience; however, younger participants (age 17-37) did.  
And, in their meta-analysis of 164 articles (277 studies) of TMT research, Burke et al. 
(2010) found that mortality salience manipulations affect college students more than they 
affect non-college students. Similarly, mortality salience manipulations affect Americans 
more than they affect Europeans and Israelis, or Asians (Burke et al., 2010).  However, 
they did not find that gender affected mortality salience effects (Burke et al., 2010). No 
studies were found that assess whether income is related to mortality salience effects. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the results of the current study would generalize to a more 
ethnically, age, and socioeconomically diverse sample. 
Strengths 
Despite the limitations of this study, the methodology and findings do make a 
significant contribution to the ever-growing TMT literature. First, prior TMT literature 
has neglected to measure overall worldview (one‟s values and beliefs across all areas of 
life). Therefore, it was unclear whether mortality salience affects defense of one‟s overall 
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worldview or only of smaller, more specific, parts of one‟s worldview. It was also 
unclear whether a person‟s overall worldview affects mortality salience effects.  Given 
the lack of consideration paid to overall worldview, we felt it necessary to investigate 
people‟s overall worldviews. The Tomkins‟ Polarity Scale (1964) is a way to measure 
one‟s overall way of looking at the world, and has been shown to be related to more 
specific worldviews, such as religion, philosophy, and politics. Thus, our use of this scale 
as a way to investigate people‟s overall worldviews allowed us to measure whether the 
anxiety buffer hypothesis of TMT applies only to the usefulness of defending specific 
cultural worldviews when confronted with existential anxiety, or whether it goes beyond 
that and also applies to the usefulness of defending overall worldviews. The employment 
of the Tomkin‟s Modified Polarity Scale will also allow future TMT research to 
investigate if and how overall worldview impacts TMT dynamics. The TMT literature 
contains a number of experimental designs aimed at delineating the component processes 
of mortality salience effects.  The addition of Tomkins‟ Modified Polarity Scale to those 
designs would vastly increase our understanding of how personal and personality 
variables act at the level of each component process. 
The study suggests that the overall worldviews of humanism and normativism 
were not related to cultural worldview, at least as it is typically measured. Specifically 
humanism and normativism were not related to American identity and, similarly, did not 
moderate the relationship between mortality salience and defense of the American 
worldview. Given that being humanist or normative was unrelated to American identity, 
one would not expect humanists and normatives to differ in their defense of the American 
worldview in the mortality salience condition. However, if TMT is generalizable to 
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overall worldviews, versus smaller, cultural worldviews, one would expect humanists to 
defend the humanist worldview and normatives to defend the normative worldview in the 
mortality salience condition. At least for humanists, TMT did generalize to include 
defense of an overall worldview. The construction of the normative essays in the current 
experiment may have unexpectedly biased the results. Thus, future research may 
determine whether TMT does not apply to normatives, or whether the way that normative 
worldview defense was measured in this study impacted the results. On a separate point, 
knowledge that TMT did work for a more comprehensive view of worldview adds to the 
growing body of TMT literature and further strengthens the theory. 
Past research had rarely addressed where individual differences entered the TMT 
model (with the exception of self-esteem) to moderate the relationship between mortality 
salience and worldview defense. Results of this study indicate that the overall worldview 
does not influence evocation of death-thoughts. Therefore, if one‟s overall worldview 
does moderate the relationship between mortality salience and worldview defense, as was 
the case with humanism, that moderation occurs between evocation of death-thoughts 
outside of awareness and distal defenses (i.e., worldview defense; see Figure 1, p. 3 for 
TMT model). Individual differences in personal ideology do not appear to moderate the 
ability of mortality salience to prime death-thoughts. Being humanist or non-humanist 
affects worldview defense after the death-thoughts have been primed.  
Together, these findings may help clarify past research. For example, Greenberg 
and colleagues (1992) found that tolerance decreased American worldview defense and 
that liberals (who espouse more tolerance) actually rated the opposing views more 
positively. So, given that humanists are also more tolerant and liberal (de St. Aubin, 
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1996) and that humanists did defend their own worldview but did not defend the 
American worldview, it seems likely that holding a tolerant worldview does not influence 
death thought evocation. Instead, such a worldview is defended by acceptance of people 
with views that oppose one‟s own, as long as those views do not threaten the value of 
tolerance.  
Future Directions     
The results from this study have, at least in part, further strengthened TMT in that 
worldview defense seems to go beyond cultural worldviews to overall worldviews.  TMT 
theory suggests that people defend their worldviews after mortality salience. However, 
given that normatives did not defend the normative worldview more in the mortality 
salience condition, future research could investigate whether this is because TMT does 
not apply to normatives (which seems unlikely but is a possibility), or whether there is a 
better way of measuring normativism defense. Normativism has been found to be related 
to conservativism (de St. Aubin, 1996). Conservatives devalue people with anti-
conservative views after mortality salience (Greenberg et al., 1992). Thus, it would be 
expected that normatives would devalue people with anti-normative worldviews after 
mortality salience. However, being normative is not the same as being conservative. It is 
possible that normatives are not affected by mortality salience. Or, it is possible that, like 
securely attached individuals (Mikulincer et al., 2004), normatives have another way to 
buffer anxiety other than to devalue people or essays that profess anti-normative views.  
It is also possible that normatives are affected by mortality salience in the same 
way that humanists are, but that, as mentioned above, our pro- and anti- normative essays 
did not capture pro- and anti- normativism in a way that avoided social desirability bias. 
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Beyond possible problems with the pro- and anti- normative essays, future research could 
address the problems inherent in the pro- and anti- American essays. As mentioned 
previously, the pro- and anti- American essays appear to make the writer of the pro- 
American essay seem more intelligent than the writer of the anti- American essay. 
Particularly in a college environment, it would seem that intelligence is a culturally 
prescribed value. If that is the case, then the findings in this study, and other TMT 
research that utilized these studies, may be tainted. Thus, future research should 
reconstruct the pro- and anti- American essays such that the authors appear to have equal 
intelligence, then compare responses to the new essays with responses to the current pro- 
and anti- American essays. 
As discussed previously, Pyszczynski and colleagues (1996) found that natural 
environments, such as a funeral parlor, can bring death to a sub-conscious level of 
awareness and can engender mortality salience effects. However, in that study, location 
was the mortality salience manipulation. It remains unknown whether survey settings can 
influence mortality salience effects. We know that context matters. Simon and colleagues 
(1997) manipulated participants‟ mode of thinking through experimenter dress and 
language, and found that mortality salience effects did not occur for participants who 
were in the rational mode of thinking (formal dress/speech of experimenter) but did occur 
for participants who were in the emotional mode of thinking (informal dress/speech of 
experimenter). Thus, it seems likely that different locations could also bring about 
different modes of thinking, depending on the different characteristics of the locations. 
Future research may investigate whether TMT effects occur as strongly when completed 
by participants in the comfort of their home environments versus in a laboratory. 
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Additional variables may accompany these contextual differences and potentially 
influence results, such as whether friends are present, reminders about the importance of 
the study, researcher presence in the room, etc. 
 While the current investigation focused on overall worldview, other individual 
difference variables comprise fertile ground for further research, and researchers could 
investigate how individual difference variables are related to defense of cultural 
worldviews and of overall worldviews. One rich area of individual differences lies in the 
personality development of individuals.  College students are generally developing their 
identities in multiple areas in a stage that has been labeled “emerging adulthood” (Arnett, 
2004, p. 4). The vast majority of TMT research has been conducted with college students. 
Yet, as mentioned above, Maxfield and colleagues (2007) found that mortality salience 
did not have the expected worldview defense effects for older adults (age 61-84) but did 
for younger participants (age 17-37). Somewhat contradicting this, Burke and colleagues‟ 
(2010) meta-analysis indicated that mortality salience manipulations affect college 
students more than they affect non-college students, but did not find differences for age 
or gender. A possible explanation for these findings could be that participants are in 
different stages of personality development. Even within emerging adulthood, a stage that 
roughly includes 18-29 year olds (though individuals can enter it earlier or leave it later), 
individuals are often at different stages of identity development in the areas of love and 
sex, career, and religious beliefs and personal values (Arnett, 2004).  
The population used in the current study was made up of participants who 
generally fit into the developmental stage of emerging adulthood. Thus, there is likely 
variability within the sample in identity development and self-assurance in values. There 
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is some indication that personal values influence mortality salience effects. Joireman and 
Duell (2007) found that participants who were low in self-transcendent values evaluated 
human-related charities more highly in the mortality salience condition than in the dental 
pain condition. Experimental condition did not affect the ratings of human-related 
charities for participants high in self-transcendent values. Future research should 
investigate whether state of identity development and security in one‟s values affect 
mortality salience dynamics.   
Another stage of personality development that could influence mortality salience 
effects is generativity versus stagnation. Someone who is highly generative, someone 
who invests much of his/herself for the benefit of future generations (McAdams & de St. 
Aubin, 1992), would have already developed, or would be in the process of developing, 
his/her symbolic immortality.  Generativity might resemble religiosity in its ability to 
modulate mortality salience effects. Like intrinsically religious people, whose literal and 
symbolic death transcendence is built into their way of living, generative individuals 
possess symbolic immortality, and, thus, may be less likely to employ typical worldview 
defense in the face of mortality salience. As mentioned previously, Jonas and Fischer 
(2006) found that people who were intrinsically religious and who had an opportunity to 
reaffirm those religious beliefs demonstrated less death-thought accessibility and less 
worldview defense. It could be interesting to see if that same pattern holds for people 
who are highly generative.   
We know that people who have different personality types respond differently to 
mortality salience. For example, people who are high authoritarians disparage dissimilar 
others after mortality salience, whereas people who are low authoritarians do not 
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(Greenberg et al., 1990). However, we do not know whether being in different 
developmental stages (e.g., emerging adult versus young adult versus middle 
adult/generativity) is related to differences in mortality salience effects.  Nor do we know 
whether successfully resolving the task of a particular developmental stage (e.g., 
becoming generative versus self-absorbed) moderates mortality salience effects.  It may 
be that an emerging adult who is generative responds differently to mortality salience 
than does an older adult who is generative. It may also be that an emerging adult who is 
generative responds differently to mortality salience than does an older adult who is 
stagnated. These are all possibilities that could be explored in future research. 
Other studies have not investigated whether an attack on the aspects of one‟s 
worldview that have been shown to be related to less cultural worldview defense, such as 
an attack on one‟s tolerance, or an attack on one‟s liberalism, would lead to increased 
mortality salience effects. The findings from the current study would indicate that, after 
mortality salience, a person whose tolerance plays a significant part in his/her worldview 
would defend the value of being tolerant, even if he/she would not defend his/her 
nationalistic worldview.    
The results of this study have strengthened TMT, have suggested extensions of 
the theory, and have engendered numerous possibilities for future research. This 
investigation of worldview defense and personal ideology has utilized an operationalized 
definition of overall worldview and has extended the anxiety buffer hypothesis of TMT 
to include defense of overall worldviews after mortality salience. This will allow future 
TMT research to investigate further whether and how overall worldview impacts TMT 
dynamics. The results of analyzing where in the TMT model individual difference 
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variables potentially moderate mortality salience effects suggested that individual 
differences in personal ideology do not affect proximal defenses or priming of death 
thoughts. Rather, they have their effect between death thoughts that are outside conscious 
awareness and worldview defense. This clarifies past research and sets the stage for 
future inquiries into the impact of individual differences on TMT dynamics.  
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Appendix 
The Gratitude Questionnaire -Six Item Form (GQ-6) 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much you 
agree with it. 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = slightly disagree 
4 = neutral 
5 = slightly agree 
6 = agree 
7 = strongly agree 
____1. I have so much in life to be thankful for. 
____2. If I had to list everything that I felt grateful for, it would be a very long list. 
____3. When I look at the world, I don‟t see much to be grateful for. 
____4. I am grateful to a wide variety of people. 
____5. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and situations 
that have been part of my life history. 
____6. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or someone. 
 
Scoring Instructions: 
1. Reverse scores for items 3 and 6. 
2. Add scores for items 1-6, using reversed scores for items 3 and 6. 
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Modified Polarity Scale 
Instructions:  Consider each of the following 40 pairs of ideas and check which of them you agree 
with.  Please read BOTH statements in each item first.  If you agree with both of them check 
both of them.  If you agree with neither do not check either one.  If you agree only with the idea 
on the left then check only the box on the left. If you agree only with the idea on the right then 
check only the box on the right.  
 
The maintenance of law and order is the  1 Promotion of the welfare of the 
most important duty of any government.   people is the most important function of  
a government. 
 
To assume that most people are well-  2 To assume that most people are  
meaning brings out the best in others.   well-meaning is asking for trouble. 
 
Parents should first of all be gentle  3 Parents should first of all be firm  
with children.      with children. 
 
Children must be loved so that they can   4 Children must be taught how to act  
grow up to be fine adults.    so that they can grow up to be fine 
adults. 
 
 
What children demand should be of little 5 What children demand, parents  
consequence to their parents.                 should take seriously and  try  
to satisfy. 
 
 
When people are in trouble, they should  6 When people are in trouble, they  
help themselves and not depend on others  need help and should be helped. 
 
Competition brings out the best in   7 Cooperation brings out the 
human beings.      best in human beings. 
 
The most important characteristic of  8 The most important characteristic 
friends is that they are worthy of our   of friends is that they are warm and  
admiration and respect.     responsive to us. 
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The main thing in the world is    9 The main thing in the world is to  
to know yourself and be yourself.   try to live up to the highest  
       standards. 
 
The main purpose of education should be 10 The main purpose of education  
to enable the young to discover and   should be to teach the young the  
create novelty.      wisdom of the remote and recent past. 
 
Juvenile delinquency is simply a reflection 11 Juvenile delinquency is due to  
of the basic evil in human beings.  It has    factors we do not understand.    
always existed in the past and it always    When we do understand these we  
will.       will be able to prevent it in the future.     
 
When you face death you learn how   12 When you face death, you learn who  
basically insignificant you are.    you really are and how much you loved 
life. 
 
The main thing in science is to be   13 The main thing in science is to strike 
right and make as few errors as possible.    out into the unknown - right or 
        wrong. 
 
Great achievements require   14 Great achievements require 
first of all great imagination.    first of all severe self-discipline.           
 
If human beings were really honest with  15 If human beings were really honest with  
each other, there would be a lot more        each other, there would be a lot 
hostility and hatred in the world.   more sympathy and friendship in the   
world.       
  
The beauty of theorizing is that it has   16 The trouble with theorizing is that it  
made it possible to invent things that    leads people away from facts and  
otherwise never would have existed.   substitutes opinions for truth.        
 
Imagination leads people into delusions.  17 Imagination frees people self- 
       deception and from the dull routines.             
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Thinking is responsible for all       18     Thinking keeps people on the  
discovery and invention.    straight and narrow. 
 
Observing the world accurately enables   19 Observing the world accurately  
human beings to separate reality from   provides a human being with  
imagination.      constant excitement and novelty. 
 
 
Fear can make the bravest person tremble. 20   Cowardice is despicable and in a 
We should not condemn a failure of nerve.  soldier should be severely punished.            
 
When a person feels sorry for one‟s self,  21 When a person feels sorry for one‟s  
she/he really needs more sympathy.     self she/he should feel ashamed.            
 
Some people can only be changed by  22 No one has the right to humiliate 
humiliating them.     another person.            
 
No one has the right to threaten or punish 23 Some people respond only to  
another person.       punishment or the threat of punishment.  
 
Human beings are basically evil.  24 Human beings are basically good. 
 
Those who err should be forgiven.   25 Those who err should be corrected.            
 
Anger should be directed against the   26 Anger should be directed    
oppressors of humankind.    against revolutionaries who 
        undermine law and order. 
 
 
Familiarity, like absence, makes   27 Familiarity breeds contempt. 
the heart grow fonder. 
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You cannot understand another human  28 You cannot understand another  
being until you have achieved some   human being unless you have loved  
distance from that person.    and been intimate with that person. 
 
Reason is the chief means by which humans 29 Reason has to be continually  
make great discoveries. disciplined and corrected by reality and 
hard facts. 
 
The changeableness of human feelings  30 The changeableness of human  
is a weakness in human beings.    feelings makes life more interesting. 
 
Human beings should be loved at all times, 31 Human beings should be loved only  
because they want and need to be loved.   if they have acted so that they  
deserve to be loved. 
 
There are a great many things in the world 32 There are a great many things which  
which are good for humans and which   attract human beings.  Some of  
satisfy them in different ways.  This   them are proper but many are  
makes the world an exciting place and   bad for humans and some are very  
enriches the lives of humans.    degrading. 
 
Children should be seen and not heard.  33 Children are entirely delightful. 
 
In order to live a good life you must act   34 In order to live a good life you must  
like a good person and observe the rules      satisfy both yourself and others. 
of morality.       
 
Mystical experiences may be sources   35  So-called mystical experiences have  
of insight into the nature of reality.   most often been a source of delusion. 
 
You must always leave yourself open to  36 If sanity is to be preserved, you must 
your own feelings --alien as they may   guard yourself against the intrusion of 
sometimes seem.     feelings which are alien to your nature. 
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To act on impulse is to act childishly.    37 To act on impulse makes life  
       interesting.  
 
Human beings should be treated with   38 Human beings should be treated with 
respect at all times.     respect only when they deserve respect. 
 
There is no surer road to insanity than  39 There is a unique avenue to reality 
surrender to the feelings, particularly        through the feelings, even when 
those which are alien to the self.    they seem alien. 
 
The mind is like a lamp which   40 The mind is like a mirror  
illuminates whatever it shines on.   which reflects whatever strikes it. 
 
 
Scoring of Personal Ideology:  
This measure results in two scores, one for Humanism (HUM) and one for Normativism 
(NORM).  One‟s Humanism score equals the number of humanistic statements endorsed and 
one‟s Normativism score is the number of normative statements endorsed.  
 
NORM  1 HUM    NORM  8 HUM 
HUM  2 NORM    HUM  9 NORM 
HUM  3 NORM    HUM  10 NORM 
HUM  4 NORM    NORM  11 HUM 
NORM  5 HUM    NORM  12 HUM 
NORM  6 HUM    NORM  13 HUM 
NORM  7 HUM    HUM  14 NORM  
       NORM  15 HUM 
___________________________________________________________ 
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HUM  16 NORM    HUM  25 NORM 
NORM  17 HUM    HUM  26 NORM 
HUM  18 NORM    HUM  27 NORM  
NORM  19 HUM    NORM  28 HUM 
HUM  20 NORM    HUM  29 NORM 
HUM  21 NORM    NORM  30 HUM 
NORM  22 HUM    HUM  31 NORM 
HUM  23 NORM    HUM  32 NORM 
NORM  24 HUM     
____________________________________________________________ 
NORM  33 HUM 
NORM  34 HUM 
HUM  35  NORM 
HUM  36  NORM  
NORM  37 HUM 
HUM  38  NORM 
NORM  39 HUM 
HUM  40  NORM 
 
American identity 
How important is your American identity to you? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       extremely  
important       important 
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Mortality Salience Induction 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please respond to them with your first, 
natural response. 
We are looking for peoples‟ gut-level reactions to these questions. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research 
suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount 
about the individual‟s personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in order 
to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following 
questions will be appreciated. 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF YOUR 
OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK WILL 
HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE 
PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
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The PANAS 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.  Indicate to what extent 
you feel this way at the moment, that is, how you feel right now. 
       
        1      2        3   4       5 
very slightly  a little  moderately       quite a bit  extremely 
or not at all  
 
_____interested      _____irritable 
_____distressed      _____alert 
_____excited      _____ashamed 
_____upset      _____inspired 
_____strong      _____nervous 
_____guilty      _____determined 
_____scared      _____attentive 
_____hostile      _____jittery 
_____enthusiastic     _____active 
_____proud      _____afraid 
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
Strongly Agree  Agree  Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 3     2      1   0 
1. _____I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
2. _____I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. _____All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4. _____I am able to do things as well as most people. 
5. _____I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6. _____I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. _____On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8. _____I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. _____I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. _____At times I think that I am no good at all. 
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Death-thought Accessibility 
Death-thought 
SAMPLE WORD COMPLETION TASK 
We are simply pre-testing this questionnaire for future studies.  Please complete the following by 
filling letters in the blanks to create words.  Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes 
to mind.  Write one letter per blank.  Some words may be plural.  Thank you. 
 
1.  BUR _ _ D      14. CHA _ _ 
2.  PLA _ _      15. KI _ _ ED 
3.  _ _ OK      16. CL _ _ K 
4.  WAT _ _      17. TAB _ _  
5.  DE _ _      18. W _ _ DOW 
6.  MU _ _      19. SK _ _ L 
7.  _ _ NG      20. TR _ _  
8.  B _ T _ LE      21. P _ P _ R 
9.  M_ J _ R      22. COFF _ _ 
10. P _ _ TURE      23.  _ O _ SE 
11. FL _ W _ R      24. POST _ _ 
12. GRA _ _      25. R _ DI _ 
13. K _ _GS
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Neutral Thought 
SAMPLE WORD COMPLETION TASK 
We are simply pre-testing this questionnaire for future studies.  Please complete the following by 
filling letters in the blanks to create words.  Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes 
to mind.  Write one letter per blank.  Some words may be plural.  Thank you. 
 
1.  SP _ _ N      14. _ _ EK 
2.  FA _ T _ R      15. M _ _ N 
3.  M _ _ EL      16. P _ LL _ W 
4.  RE _ _ RD      17. PL _ _  
5.  DR _ S _ R      18. C _ BI _ ET 
6.  SN _ AKE _      19. _ _ BE 
7.   _ _ AP      20. _ A _ D 
8.  _ _ GHT      21. S _ _ DY 
9.  _ E _ SON      22. P _ _ TY 
10. PH _ N _       23. ST _ R _ O 
11. _ _ ORT       24.  _ IR _ 
12. CO _ _ C      25. NO _ _ L 
13. BR _ _ K 
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Worldview Defense Essays 
Social Judgment Task 
Please read each of the following essays and respond to the questions that follow each essay. 
Pro American  
The first thing that hit me when I came to this country was the incredible freedom people had.  
Freedom to go to school, freedom to work in any job you want.  In this country people can go to 
school and train for the job they want.  Here anyone who works hard can make their own success.  
In my country most people live in poverty with no chance of escape.  In this country people have 
more opportunity for success than in any other and success does not depend on the group belong 
to.  While there are problems in any country, America truly is a great nation and I don‟t regret my 
decision to come here at all.  
 
Questions: 
1.  How much do you like this person? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
2.  How intelligent did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
3.  How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
4.  How much did you agree with this person‟s opinion? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
5.  From your perspective, how true do you think this person‟s opinion is? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
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Anti American  
When I first came to this country from my home in              I believed it was the “land of 
opportunity” but I soon realized this was only true for the rich.  The system here is set up for rich 
against the poor.  All people care about here is money and trying to have more than other people.  
This no sympathy for people.  Its all one group putting down others and nobody cares about the 
foreigners.  The people only let foreigners have jobs like pick fruit or wash dishes because no 
American would do it.  Americans are spoiled and lazy and want everything handed to them.  
America is a cold country that is unsensitive to needs and problems of foreigners.  It thinks it‟s a 
great country but its not.  
 
Questions: 
1.  How much do you like this person? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
2.  How intelligent did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
3.  How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
4.  How much did you agree with this person‟s opinion? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
5.  From your perspective, how true do you think this person‟s opinion is? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
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Pro Normativism 
During my lifetime, I have learned a lot about human nature.  Although it would be nice to think 
that people are all good at heart, the truth is that most people only have their own best interests in 
mind.  In fact, if people were actually honest with each other, I think we would find much more 
hostility and hatred in the world.  Even without complete honesty, all you have to do is open your 
eyes to see how humans fight constantly.  That‟s not to say that all people are bad.  I think we can 
all agree that friends who are worthy of our admiration and respect add to our lives and may even 
help us live up to the high standards and rules of morality that we should always strive towards.   
 
Questions: 
1.  How much do you like this person? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
2.  How intelligent did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
3.  How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
4.  How much did you agree with this person‟s opinion? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
5.  From your perspective, how true do you think this person‟s opinion is? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
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Pro Humanism 
Throughout my life, I have learned that humans are amazing creatures.  We perceive our 
surroundings and are able to make meaning and find reality in the constant stream of information 
we receive.  Although we often do bad things, we have mostly good intentions, and, despite our 
mistakes, we are all able to (and need to) give and receive love.  Beyond just love, we are able to 
experience a wide range of emotions that help us to have more full experiences and to interact 
with the world.  When children are given a loving, nurturing environment within which they can 
explore the world, experience their emotions, and use their active imaginations, there is no limit 
to what they can achieve. 
 
Questions: 
1.  How much do you like this person? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
2.  How intelligent did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
3.  How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
4.  How much did you agree with this person‟s opinion? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
5.  From your perspective, how true do you think this person‟s opinion is? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
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Anti-Humanism 
I just do not understand how some people can think that humans are inherently good, that they 
actually construct their own reality, and that experiencing the world and emotions is more 
important than following conventions.  Look at all of the horrible things that people do to each 
other on a daily basis.  Is that goodness?  I don‟t see how it could be that we live in a reality 
created by such imperfect beings.  Allowing openness to experiences and emotions seems foolish 
given that it only steers us away from our goals.  Similarly, loving, nurturing, and allowing 
children to express their feelings only harms the children by making them into weak adults who 
cannot function in the reality of our harsh world. 
 
Questions: 
1.  How much do you like this person? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
2.  How intelligent did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
3.  How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
4.  How much did you agree with this person‟s opinion? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
5.  From your perspective, how true do you think this person‟s opinion is? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
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Anti-Normativism 
I have a lot of trouble with people who believe that there is one “truth” and one “right way” of 
being and that people don‟t deserve love and respect unless they are living out the norms and 
rules that put them on that “right path.”  These people take their children and mold them to fit all 
of the parents‟ expectations, totally stifling their individuality, creativity, and emotional 
experiences.  According to these people, allowing emotional experiences equals weakness and 
means you are not following the norms that keep you on the “right path.”  But how can anyone 
know what the “right path” is?  There is no one perfect was of being.  There are many different 
ways to be a good human being, even if that means following a different path. 
 
Questions: 
1.  How much do you like this person? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
2.  How intelligent did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
3.  How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
4.  How much did you agree with this person‟s opinion? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
5.  From your perspective, how true do you think this person‟s opinion is? 
  1    2   3    4   5    6    7    8    9 
not at all       totally 
 
